Daily Report

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Legislators Reject No-Confidence Motion

AU2705183793 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1806 GMT 27 May 93

[Protocol of result of secret ballot held in National Assembly in Sofia, read by National Assembly Deputy Lyubomir Nachev—live]

[Text] Today, 27 May, 1993, a secret ballot was held on a motion of no-confidence in Lyuben Berov, prime minister of the Republic of Bulgaria.

A commission consisting of Khristo Markov, Ruslan Semerdzhiev, Lyubomir Nachev, Kiril Zhelev, and Remzi Osman announces the following results of the ballot:

Total number of National Assembly deputies who cast their votes: 216.

Number of ballot papers cast in support of the vote of no-confidence in the prime minister: 76.

Number of ballot papers cast against the vote of no-confidence in the prime minister: 140.

Number of empty envelopes: None.

Number of envelopes containing two or more ballot papers: None.

On the basis of the results of the secret ballot and in accordance with Article 72 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and with Articles 84 and 85 of the Procedural Regulations for the Work of the National Assembly, the National Assembly decided as follows:

It rejects the proposal to pass a vote of no-confidence in Lyuben Berov, prime minister of the Republic of Bulgaria. [applause]

SDS Leaders Address Agrarian Party Rally

AU2705193893 Sofia BTA in English 1848 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Sofia, May 27 (BTA)—Today several thousands of members and followers of the extraparliamentary Bulgarian Agrarian Party held a rally raising demands for early general elections, resignation of the cabinet and a presidential suspensory veto on the Amendments to the Land Act parliament carried last week.

In her emotional address to the rally Agrarian leader Anastasiya Mozer declared herself to be against the new paragraph in the Land Act under which built-up plots will not be reversed to their lawful owners, who will be compensated in some other way. According to the Agrarians, the amendment legalizes the ownership of the best plots of land near Sofia confiscated and built up by the former communist rulers. Mrs. Mozer's appeal to the president to exercise his right to suspensory veto on the amendments was supported with posters and slogans to this effect. Most rally-goers were past their middle age.

The Agrarians' rally was supported by followers of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS). Stefan Savov, chairman of the Radical Party and floor leader of the SDS parliamentary group, and Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council, greeted the Agrarians and declared that all democratic forces should unite to fight the restoration of communism. In response to Mr. Savov's appeal, the rally-goers gave a symbolic vote of non-confidence in Prof. Lyuben Berov's government. "We have reason to believe in the victory because all of us are here," Mr. Dimitrov said.

Another appeal to the president for suspensory veto on the Land Act amendments was made by Ivan Glushkov, chairman of the extraparliamentary Christian Agrarian Party, at a press conference today.

The president wanted to know our opinion on the Land Act amendments and whether they could create social tension, Radka Vasileva, spokeswoman for the New Alliance for Democracy (a parliamentary group that split from the SDS parliamentary group some time ago), said after her meeting with President Zhelyu Zhelev today. In her view, the Land Act amendments will expedite the restitution of land within its physical boundaries.

Animals Destroyed To Combat Livestock Disease

AU2705195993 Sofia BTA in English 1501 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Sofia, May 27 (BTA)—Today the Council of Ministers decided to destroy 2,330 head of cattle, sheep and goats valued at about eight million leva. It was decided to buy disinfectants, vaccines and other necessary preparations, by which the expenses incurred for liquidating the foot-and-mouth disease [FMD] centre in Simeonovgrad (southeastern Bulgaria) would total some 10 million leva or about 400,000 U.S. dollars at current exchange rates.

The government's decision obliges the mayors and the municipal administrations to assist in the localization and liquidation of the centre of FMD infection. The Standing Governmental Commission for the Management of Natural Disasters and Major Industrial Accidents and the Ministry of Finance will provide the necessary funds. The cabinet appointed an Anti-Epizootic Commission with the Council of Ministers, chaired by the Minister of Agriculture, which would organize and coordinate all prophylactic measures.

Referring to an expert at the regional civil defence, the BTA correspondent reported from Khaskovo (southern Bulgaria) that arrangements were being made for the destruction of infected cows in Simeonovgrad. The vaccination of cloven-hoofed animals was completed.

Reacting to the FMD infection alarm, the veterinary service in Dobrich (northeastern Bulgaria) established a line open round the clock and began examining cloven-hoofed animals, although the area was not hit by the infection.

Defense Minister Meets Italian Delegation

AU2705194393 Sofia BTA in English 1756 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Sofia, May 27 (BTA)—Today Bulgarian Minister of Defence Valentin Aleksandrov had a meeting with an Italian military delegation comprising 45 senior officers, most of them representatives of the Higher Military Research Centre in Rome. The sides discussed the reforms in the Bulgarian Army and the exchange of experience with other countries concerning the training of senior officers. We discussed the possibility of training Bulgarian officers at the Higher Military Research Centre which is headed by General Franco Aggioni, leader of the Italian military delegation, Defence Minister Aleksandrov said after the meeting. There is an idea to establish a similar centre in Bulgaria and we can rely on our Italian colleagues for help, he said.

G-24 Experts Reach Agreement on Kozloduy Plant

AU2605193293 Sofia BTA in English 1607 GMT 26 May 93

[Text] Sofia, May 26 (BTA)—A G-24 working group ended a two-day meeting here, the boss of the Committee on Peaceful Atomic Energy Uses Yanko Yanev told a news conference today. The group includes representatives of major donor nations, the United States, UK, France, Germany, Spain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.

"The meeting ended in a consensus on all issues. Most importantly, we reached complete agreement on the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant Project and we hope the committee of donors will make a final decision within 15 days," Mr. Yanev said.

The Kozloduy N-Plant is the first of fifteen plants in Eastern Europe to receive aid from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD funds allocated for the improvement of the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe amounts to 60 million dollars.

International Atomic Energy Agency experts recently praised the steps to improve safety and the considerable progress made in Kozloduy. The Bulgarian N-plant may be considered safe up to Western standards, after 75 percent of equipment was updated, EC experts said a month ago. The modernization has so far cost the EC ECU [European Currency Units] 25 million. Another ECU 10 million are needed to complete it.

Conference on Banking Supervision Ends

AU2705194493 Sofia BTA in English 1835 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Sofia, May 27 (BTA)—The progress of banking reform, the place of banking supervision, the role of the supervisory institution in risk situations, and a harmonization of the bank supervision system were the main subjects of an international conference on banking supervision which ended today. It was held under the auspices of the Basle Committee of Supervisors and hosted by the National Bank of Bulgaria (BNB). Taking part were bank officials from Central and Eastern Europe.

The idea of the working conference was to share experience, hear different opinions and establish contacts between experts working in bank supervision, Mr. Kamen Toshkov, member of the BNB Governing Board and chief of the Banking Supervision Department, told a news conference today. This fifth such meeting was attended by representatives of a record large number of countries, he pointed out. The newcomers included Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova and Slovakia, and Slovenia resumed its participation [passage indistinct] showed great interest in the meeting.

The participants found that the level of banking supervision in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe was quite similar and that they faced the same type of problems, according to Mr. Toshkov. He indicated that the establishment of supervision is a rather complicated process which has yet to be completed even in the advanced countries in the EC.

Mr. Frederich Moush, secretary general of the Basle Committee, said that this process can make faster progress in the former socialist countries because they can use the experience of the rest of the countries in Europe.

This year there are plans to hold a training course for young experts of the banking supervision departments of the central banks in Eastern and Central Europe, Mr. Moush said.

President Havel Undergoes Minor Surgery

LD2705121493 Prague CTK in English 1139 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Prague May 27 (CTK)—Czech President Vaclav Havel underwent minor surgery today in Prague, his spokesman Ladislav Spacek told CTK.

The procedure, which Spacek declined to detail, had been planned for some time and did not affect any life-sustaining organs, he said.

Spacek refused comment on whether this hospitalisation was connected to Havel's January 7 operation for the removal of a subcutaneous growth.

Spacek did confirm the operation was not tied to a surgical procedure for the removal of a hernia in 1990.

Foreign Ministry Accepts New German Asylum Law

LD2705134593 Prague CTK in English 1315 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Prague, May 27 (CTK)—The Czech Foreign Ministry accepts the German Bundestag's adoption of a law which tightens restrictions on the granting of asylum in Germany with understanding, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement delivered to CTK today.

The Foreign Ministry statement stressed, however, that it had repeatedly emphasised in negotiations with Bonn that Germany could resolve its security problems at the expense of the Czech Republic. [sentence as received]

The Foreign Ministry therefore expects that the readiness of the Czech Republic to cooperate in the resolution of security problems will in the future also lead Germany and the other European Community (EC) states to greater and more active cooperation with the Czech Republic in including it in European security and defence structures, the statement said.

The Foreign Ministry said it would only be prepared to sign an agreement with Germany on the possible re-admission of asylum seekers after concluding an agreement with Slovakia on tightening the Czech-Slovak border.

Klaus Warns Against Wage Increases

LD2705040893 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1630 GMT 26 May 93

[Text] For the time being, the Czech Government has decided not to withdraw its proposal to introduce wage regulation in some companies. Marie Ruzickova reports.

[Ruzickova] The government has more than once expressed concern over the surge of wages, and that is why the cabinet has prepared a proposal for the regulation of wages which it intends to present to the tripartite meeting [between the government, employers, and trade unions] tomorrow [27 May]. Deputy Prime Minister Josef Lux described the mentioned proposal:

[Begin recording] [Lux] Those companies which have a favorable balance of production and wage development need not fear. As for companies where wages are not developing in line with the development of production and sales, the government has prepared several options which it wants to present to the tripartite meeting. These options actually represent an alternative to additional taxes.

[Ruzickova] [passage omitted] As far as the possible boycott of wage regulation by the trade unions is concerned, the premier said:

[Begin recording] [Klaus] The government has been authorized by the parliament to act in this way. I do not think it can be against the interest of responsible trade union associations or against the interest of responsible employees' unions if we disclose that in some companies average wages have increased by more than 50, 60, 70, or 80 percent. I would be surprised if the trade union organizations and employees' associations were happy with that because that would point to a very dangerous phenomenon which, in economic terms, is called wage drift. In Czech we translate that as wage osmosis [mzdove vzlinani], and that is a very destabilizing thing. [end recording]

Meat Imports Banned From Hungary, Bulgaria

AU2705194693 Prague CTK in English 1822 GMT 25 May 93

[Text] Prague, May 25 (CTK)— The Czech State Veterinary Authority (SVS) today banned imports of live pigs, pork meat, pork offal and products made of them, not thermally processed, from the Hungarian region of Szabalcs-Szatmar-Bereg and from two neighboring regions, CTK learnt today.

Antonin Kozak, SVS director, said that the two other regions were Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen and Hajdu-Bihar.

The measure was taken in reaction to the announcement that swine fever has occurred in Hungary in the above-mentioned regions which border on Ukraine and Eastern Slovakia. The disease was found in seven animals from two private farms.

Kozak said that the SVS had also imposed a ban on imports and transit of live animals, thermally or chemically unprocessed foodstuffs made of them, milk, unprocessed hides, bowels and fodder from Bulgaria where foot and mouth disease had reportedly occurred.

Zieleniec Discusses Foreign Policy

AU2705125693 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 21 May 93 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Jozsef Zieleniec by Vaclav Belohradsky and Vladimir Cerny; place and date not given: "Solidarity Facilitates Coexistence"]

[Text] [LIDOVE NOVINY] A significant book on the contemporary economy and contemporary society is titled Wealth Without Nations—that means the wealth that the nations no longer control, what is beyond the borders of states. What is foreign policy in the age of wealth without nations?

[Zieleniec] I believe that foreign policy consists of several levels, and only one concerns the age of the wealth without nations. The conditions of today's world are such that whatever happens on one end of the world has an immediate effect on the people who live on the other end. The means and tools that the foreign policy has at its disposal change. At the same time, however, the responsibility, the solidarity, that no doubt is a significant part of the foreign policy, also change. The solidarity that used to be connected to a similar civilization, faith, proximity, and neighborhood, is now evidenced to a certain degree on the worldwide scale. This solidarity also is the mechanism that will enable nations to live with one another. Hence, the wealth without nations is also an appeal for a wider range of solidarity in international relations.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What is the main difference between Czechoslovak foreign policy and Czech foreign policy?

[Zieleniec] A political change certainly occurred. There were elections last year, and they resulted in certain changes in the orientation of foreign policy. There is a different government, a different policy statement, different parties in the government, different individuals, etc. On the other hand, I would say that it rather is a matter of stress. It may be that this government, more than the previous one, emphasizes that we actually have no other alternative.

Changes occurred in foreign policy because the geopolitical context has changed. It is a change that is invariable with respect to the policy of this or that party, this or that political figure. The state is smaller and differently set in central Europe. A large part of our border is with the German-speaking countries. There is also an entirely new circumstance—the border with Slovakia. That is an unknown experience. The relative length of the border with the traditionally Western states (Austria, Germany)—I am speaking from the modern point of view, that of the past 40 years—is much longer in comparison with the rest of the border. That means we are being pushed more to the West. We have lost the immediate contact with the Danubian region, the traditional passage to the restless south and southeast of Europe. We no longer have direct contact with the territory of the former Soviet Union. All this shows that the Western orientation of our foreign policy is deeply rooted in the geopolitical location of our state.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] You have frequently observed that foreign policy with respect to the countries of Western Europe, the EC, should be active. We should actively participate in the discussion of the future form of the EC, if only because we intend to join the organization. How do you visualize the Europe toward which we strive?

[Zieleniec] I do not believe that we can conceive of a clear image. After all, you know well that these discussions are in progress in all EC countries, and the procedure is debated more than the goal. It is an open-ended task. That is so, above all, because the closed vision that the founders of the community had in mind was closely connected with the division of Europe, the bipolarity that used to be here.

I have been saying that it is our duty to discuss the future form of the EC because a house is built there in which we are going to live one day. I believe that our contribution to this construction, to this quest, is our experience, what we lived through in the recent as well as the less recent past. A very specific attribute of the postcommunist societies is—and it is very prominent in our country—the relatively keen perception of the relationship between only marginally parliament-controlled supervision on the one hand, and the effective operation of society at all levels. Apart from the experience with totalitarianism, communism represents a significant experience with the mechanism of state administration.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Can this be understood to mean that Czech foreign policy should support the forces in the EC that favor the gradual elimination of economic red tape?

[Zieleniec] Not only that. Bureaucracy is just one part of the problem, the other part is the weak parliamentary dimension. If you tally the clerks in Brussels, of whom no one speaks, and correlate their number with the size of the EC territory they administer, you will see that there are not that many of them after all. They are fewer than those working in some federal laender in Germany. That is a matter of balance between the executive and the parliamentary components, the accountability of the executives to the directly elected bodies.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The weekly RESPEKT criticized the Czech policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It accuses the policy of excessive alibism, pragmatism....

[Zieleniec] There are ellipses there, right?

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Yes.

[Zieleniec] I believe that the fact that such a discussion is already starting is important. It demonstrates that our intellectuals are awakening. A discussion about the relationship between the views on politics as, on the one hand, a practical activity for the purpose of satisfying immediate requirements, and, on the other hand, a demonstration of a certain imperative of solidarity and the ethical dimension, is a discussion that must be undertaken by intellectuals in every country. The absence of such a discussion opens, on one hand, space for a cynical and cunning avoidance of the problem, and on the other hand, for cheap, moralizing proclamations.

The recalcitrance and tardiness of the discussion here show that we are in an exceptional situation and that we are truly absorbed in the building of our own state. He who follows the German, British, Italian, and French newspapers knows that the intellectual elite has been debating this issue—the practical correlations among the European nations—for months. Hence, let us thank the Lord for RESPEKT finally taking the step.

Of course, a realistic foreign polity must be based on realistic possibilities. That is so. This challenge, or appeal, probably is the only act that can be performed without a practical deed following. I believe that the relationship between the word and the act is also one with an ethical dimension, and in the long run, it must be reflected in politics.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The allegations that our contribution to the conceivable intervention in the Balkans by the international community can only be logistical-support units or, perhaps, a military hospital, might create a certain illusion. In the actual deployment, however, these soldiers—even Army physicians—would be, because of the form of the conflict, in the same danger as the combat units....

[Zieleniec] You know the saying, you cannot eat the cake and have it too. When we speak of solidarity, we must be aware of the cost. If we do not want to hear of the cost, we should not be talking about solidarity. That is what I keep repeating: The foreign policy can only build on what is there. Either we want to show the solidarity and be willing to bear the risks, or we do not. Let us not intrigue. That would be obvious right away. Therefore, I oppose all empty declarations and ask everyone who advocates military intervention there or elsewhere: Are you willing to sign the order to our units?

[LIDOVE NOVINY] In a recent discussion about the integration of the central European countries into the EC, an idea was expressed of a certain interim stage between the association and full membership. It apparently should cover the political level of integration, but at the same time reflect our perhaps inadequate ability of full integration on the economic level. How do you feel about this alternative?

[Zieleniec] I am not very enthusiastic about this idea, and I will tell you why. We have always emphasized that the matter of integration of the Central European countries and the Czech Republic into the EC is a two-way process. We know that we must exert a lot of effort, that it is above all our responsibility to work on becoming a standard Western-type society capable of joining Europe.

That, however, is only a part of the picture. Our countries joining Europe will also have a certain effect on Western Europe itself. Therefore, the trade limitation is so problematic for us. It is not that much the trade—during the tremendous economic changes, we can stand some embargoes. The problem is that such actions place a question mark over the sincerity of the political declarations of Western Europe claiming an intent to overcome the trauma of the iron curtain and willingness to live together with us in the future. If someone wants to live with us, he obviously must exert maximum effort. Europe must get used to the fact that the talk about the life together must not be empty phrases, that they have some consequences and these must be faced.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] This newspaper carried a claim that Czech foreign policy has not been sufficiently coordinated between the Castle and the Foreign Ministry. It seems that this impression is shared by many people. Is it just an optical illusion?

[Zieleniec] This question has several aspects. One is this: Since the election of the president—who has certain constitutional powers, while other constitutional powers are shared by the foreign minister and the entire government under the leadership of the prime minister—a process has taken place that I would call "staking claims" in applied politics. That is not insignificant, because the formulation of the relevant laws is quite general, and the protagonists in question are very distinguished figures. Of course, in the conditions of the new state, and the new relations and context, it takes time, and customs are built slowly. That does not apply only to the Foreign Ministry and the Castle. Whoever follows foreign politicy will have noticed similar problems in the relationship between the Foreign Ministry and the government, or the prime minister, etc. That is quite normal.

That is one level of the problem, and I believe that the development in these relations will converge in the constitutional and working traditions of a successful state. One can utilize the advantage of differences in distinct constitutional definitions for joint decisions. In foreign policy, the domestic consensus is much more important than in a discussion of tax reforms, for instance.

Another level is established by the journalistic community that often focuses on the more spectacular but less important aspects of the given issue. It is important, for instance, that I am currently drafting a proposal that a foreign policy council be established. It is a body that exists in many countries. The council would include all ministers whose departments are affected by foreign policy. Of course, the president will have the right to participate in any session. Here, the external aspects of the foreign policy would be dealt with in a less formal manner, as well as the segregation of individual tasks in reaching the objectives. This type of communication would certainly facilitate a more effective foreign policy.

That is the way it is in politics. Everyone must communicate with all who take part in political life, legitimately occupy certain posts, and hold the corresponding powers. That is political reality, and if someone cannot do this, he has no place in politics.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The German question is of major importance for Czech foreign policy. There are considerable political forces that reduce the Czech-German issue to the Sudeten issue or see the dialogue with the Sudeten Germans as something conditional for dialogue with Germany.

[Zieleniec] If we accepted this, it would be the biggest mistake not only of our foreign policy, but of our entire nation. Let us have a look at Germany: Germany is a large state, historically always very diversified, and the Czech problem has always been present in German history and politics as a part of the political context. That is one thing. Another matter is that our relationship with Germany has always been much more complex than the relationship with just our Germans, i.e. including the Sudeten Germans after the war. I am convinced that turning our backs on one another would mean that the only link between us and Germany would be the past, and the only group connecting us with Germany would be the Sudeten Germans. Therefore, I believe that the policy of confrontation with Germany that can be detected in numerous rhetorical exercises of our left wing is wrong.

Our only chance with respect to Germany is to follow the past with manifold, rich, and mutually advantageous cooperation. On both sides, it is necessary to expand the group of people for whom cooperation is an important and positive phenomenon.

We must realize one more thing, and that was mentioned by Vaclav Belohradsky in his LIDOVE NOVINY article. It is not only us needing Germany. That is often underestimated in our outlook. Germany will have to be proving—not only to Europe but, above all, to itself—that the nightmare is over and that it found its place in Europe. The cooperation with us is one of the pieces in the process of reestablishment of the German nation in European relations. I am convinced that from this point of view, not only is Germany an important European partner for us, but we are an important partner for Germany.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] We have a new neighbor. How will our relationship develop in the future? Are we going to drift apart or get closer together?

[Zieleniec] You know that in politics, forecasting always serves some purpose. They are not just wishes, but also indications of political intent. For example, I would like to formulate a hypothesis as a university scholar, but I will do that later after I return to the university. I will tell you, however, what relations to Slovakia should be like and what would be in the interest of the Czech foreign policy. Every country wants to have good relations with its neighbors—that is not just a theory. He who has roots in a country village knows the importance of neighborly relations, for otherwise life could be hell. Here, the wish is multiplied by the experience of 74 years together and tremendous intensity in personal, institutional, and business relationships.

We are discovering what is for us an entirely new experience of the relationship of the capital to a former province. It probably is similar to the relationship between France and Algeria—a very complex relationship that is not just a relationship between two states. An Austrian might even feel something like that today regarding Czech-Austrian relations. It is a mixture of very intensive sentimental ties with the awareness of the common experience and the ensuing complications. I believe that precisely for this reason it is in our interest for Slovakia to remain close to us. Here, I mean close in values—so that we can be open with each other, and also close with respect to ordinary business and other forms of cooperation.

We should take these things into account when contemplating policies concerning Slovakia. It does not mean that we should insist on clear-cut solutions to the problems related to our common past, such as the property-related issue. We should stop regarding the events on the Bratislava political scene as if they occurred at home. We must finally realize that it is another state with the right to its own internal sovereign political experience.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Could complications in our relationship with Slovakia affect the integration of the Czech Republic into the EC?

[Zieleniec] Of course. You must realize that although it is a non-state structure, the EC has a large dose of superpower responsibility and superpower solidarity. Any integration of tensions, clashes, minority conflicts, or, God forbid, any other type of conflict, would be suicidal. People do not like if a family whose members argue or fight with one another moves into their apartment building. Every tension, every uncertainty, every conflict always presents a great problem in the integration into the EC. It is precisely for this reason that a structure is being formed that does not have these conflicts.

Nonetheless, I do not believe that there is potential tension or conflict. There are traditional standard situations in the relations between states that result in conflicts, such as uncertainty regarding borders or minorities, attempts for hegemony, etc. I do not believe that such sources of conflicts exist between us and Slovakia. There is no reason for bad relations with Slovakia.

Slovak Surcharge To Trigger Countermeasures

AU2805084093 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 May 93 p 2

["rs"-signed report: "The Slovak Import Surcharge Will Lead to Czech Countermeasures"]

[Excerpt] The heralded introduction of a 20-percent import surcharge in Slovakia will not lead to the hoped-for strengthening of Slovak foreign exchange reserves but will only contribute to a further decline in the volume of trade between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Czech Minister of Agriculture Josef Lux told a

news conference in Prague yesterday. Mutual trade in farm commodities between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic should be close to the level of reciprocity, the minister stressed. In this context, he added that the crucial part of food consumption in the Czech Republic must be covered by the production of Czech farmers. Should Slovakia really introduce the import surcharge, the reciprocal ratio [reciprocni pomer] of mutual trade in agrarian commodities will be disrupted and the Czech side will adopt its own measures to restore it. At the same time, Josef Lux announced that talks would still be held this week at the level of individual government departments on possible repercussions of the Slovak import surcharge. [passage omitted]

Opposition to District Communist Leadership

AU2705131393 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 24 May 93 pp 1, 2

[Jitka Goetzova and Jiri Koudc report: "Svoboda Did Not Make It in Prague"]

[Excerpts] Prague—Jiri Svoboda, chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, was not elected delegate to the 3d party congress at the district congress in Prague 6. In the vote, prior to which he and J. Mecl were sharply criticized for the current crisis within the party, Svoboda received only 6 of the 109 votes. He will take part in the congress nevertheless, because he was elected delegate at the district Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia congress in Prostejov.

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia chairman was criticized for a turnabout in the political orientation that, according to his adversaries, contradicts the conclusions of the 2d congress, and he was repeatedly asked to resign. A demand has been voiced that his faction does not participate in the preparations of the 3d congress as "most of the communists cannot accept party leadership that put itself outside the statutes."

On the other hand, parliament deputies V. Exner, J. Ortman, and M. Stiborova have been elected for the congress. Only three of the 20 speakers supported the current Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia leadership. [passage omitted]

According to some participants at the district congress in Prague 2, Svoboda discredited himself by the volatility of his views, and is unacceptable as chairman of the party. To the RUDE PRAVO question on his chances of reelection, most of those asked replied that "the chances are minimal, almost zero."

Although M. Stepan was judged very critically, the communists from Prague 2 rejected the plausibility of his expulsion because, as one of them said, "he does not have any other party." The platform For Socialism, the theses of which are close to the heart of many participants, has, according to them, the right to exist, and only the congress should decide on that.

Trnka Resigns as Chairman of Agricultural Party

AU2605202293 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 24 May 93 p 3

["(fp)"-signed report: "Trnka Has Handed Over the Scepter"]

[Excerpt] Prague—The chairman of two political bodies (Liberal Social Union and the Agricultural Party), F. Trnka, resigned from his function of chairman of the Agricultural party, in conformity with status. J. Vackar was elected "acting executive" chairman of the Agricultural Party. J. Hladik was elected organizational secretary of the Agricultural Party. [passage omitted]

Meciar: No Need To Amend Border Agreement

LD2705131093 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 27 May 93

[Excerpt] The stricter asylum law in Germany will probably result in increased pressure by the Czech side to tighten the Czech-Slovak border. The Slovak side has not yet discussed the need to change the original agreement with the Czech Republic on the common border. We asked Premier Vladimir Meciar this morning whether the new law adopted by the German Bundestag will change our stand on the matter.

[Begin Meciar recording] We have already concluded an agreement with the Czech Republic and there is no reason to amend it. We are not interested in Slovakia becoming a transit country. We do not want groups of people to travel through our country to the Czech Republic or other countries and thus cause political problems. The pressure on Slovakia already exists and it is very high. I have received a personal letter from Mr. Kohl concerning this.

We propose a different solution which we have already implemented in fact. We are strengthening the border protection, and we are introducing measures on the whole territory against illegal infiltration of citizens of foreign states to our territory. We have concluded an agreement with the Czech Republic on how to proceed in the event it is found, within a certain period, that somebody has arrived in the Czech Republic from the Slovak territory. We accept that.

We will not place obstacles to transit from Germany or from the Czech Republic through our territory. However, we cannot become an assembly point [zberne miesto]. When I last asked a parliamentary deputy approximately how many thousand people would claim in this way that they have travelled through our territory, I was given the figure of 130,000 people a year. We cannot become a place of assembly and we cannot build camps on our territory and feed those people. We do not have the resources to do so.

Therefore, our stand on the matter is logical. If we do not allow anybody through the Hungarian and Ukrainian border then the internal border between our republic and the Czech Republic need not be a physical border and it can still be a safe border.

Next, there is the open issue of backward movement. Sensible agreements need to be made so that these people are not rushed back from the Czech Republic to our country. We shall enable transit and speedy travelling through our territory. We understand this situation. We are having talks with the Ukrainian Government and with the Romanian Government aimed at getting those states to accept back those people who have crossed the borders illegally.

However, there is a new category emerging. A person comes to Germany, tears up or damages his documents so that his identity cannot be proved, so that it cannot be proved which country is he from, or what nationality. In such cases it is very difficult to identify where these people should go. [end recording] [passage omitted]

SDL Chairman Calls For Wider Coalition

AU2605121693 Prague CTK in English 1611 GMT 22 May 93

[Text] Zilina, West Slovakia, May 22 (CTK)—No political party is capable of solving the current situation in Slovakia on its own, Democratic Left Party (SDL) Chairman Peter Weiss said, addressing 270 delegates of the SDL's two-day congress, which opened here today.

The nature of the current problems and the depth of the crisis demand a government of a wider coalition, Weiss said. He said that responsibility for unpopular measures which sometimes have to be taken should be shared among a larger number of political parties so that none can be used to derive political capital.

Weiss noted his party's contribution to the legal process of establishing the independent Slovak Republic, although another solution was chosen than the one which was in our program, he said. He said that time had justified the SDL's efforts to divide former federal property prior to the division of Czechoslovakia.

Regarding the economic situation in Slovakia, Weiss pointed out the helplessness of the government in fields in which even advanced Western countries allow state interference.

Representatives of all Slovak political parties, except the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), are attending the congress of the SDL which is the second strongest political force in Slovakia. Delegates from partner parties from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy are also present.

Suspension of Czech Supplies Ruled Out

LD2705204593 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 27 May 93

[Excerpts] The signing of an intergovernmental agreement between the Slovak and Czech Republics has resulted in the division of the transit gas pipeline into two separate companies. The Transit Systems Division [Divizia tranzitnych sustav], that is part of the state enterprise Slovak Gas Industries [Slovensky plynarensky priemysel], has come into being in Slovakia. My colleague Anna Samelova discussed with (Jan Rajcinger), director of the Slovtransgas division, the consequences of the division of the Transit Gas Pipeline, its running, its technical state, and future use. [passage omitted]

[Begin Samelova recording] An affair related to the interview granted by Vladimir Meciar to the German magazine DER SPIEGEL in connection with a possible suspension of gas supplies to the Czech Republic, has been blown out of proportion recently. Will it really be so simple to turn the tap off?

[Rajcinger] Well, the tap can be turned off at any time. But I would be very glad to see that we, the Slovaks, are not regarded as some Robin Hood-like nation, a nation that first draws a sword and then wonders what to do with it! [as heard]

The closure of the gas flow to the West by Slovak transit gas pipeline is absolutely ruled out. I would like to cite these figures: Of the 72 billion cubic meters we transport per year, two billion remain in Slovakia. Approximately six billion cubic meters are delivered to the Czech Republic and the rest is delivered to Western European customers. A possible closure will have enormous economic and political consequences for the whole of the Slovak Republic. We have never given any consideration, not even theoretical, to this option.

[Samelova] For some time there have been rumors that some of the biggest world gas companies, British Petroleum or British Gas, were going to purchase Slovtransgas. Can you either confirm or refute this information? On the whole, what is the situation regarding Slovtransgas privatization?

[Rajcinger] The future of the transit pipeline can be viewed in two ways. We can, of course, sell the transit gas pipeline. Many Western companies could thus resolve Slovakia's present economic problems. But as soon as the transit pipeline is sold, Western companies will bring about a diktat of prices and tariffs, while their profits will mostly be channelled abroad.

In my view, the transit pipeline could also remain a corporation with a hundred percent state participation, no matter that this might sound pretty dreadful to some advocates of privatization. But for the time being our gas is coming from one direction only, in other words from the territory of the former Soviet Union. That is why we need certain government guarantees that this gas will continue to flow via our territory. Only when we establish what is the real price of the transit gas pipeline, only when we know what its market value is, and only when we know what gain we could realistically expect, only then can we let foreign capital into the country, providing capital investment projects are required. All these are ideas that will be properly discussed sometime in June and July this year. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Tatra Air To Suspend Flights

AU2605154193 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 25 May 93 p 2

["bl"-signed report: "Why Is Tatra Air Not Flying?"]

[Text] Bratislava— Addressing a news conference in Bratislava yesterday, Dusan Podhorsky, doctor of sciences, general director of the Tatra Air Group, cited mounting losses on domestic as well as foreign routes, which amounted to up to 250,000 korunas per day, as the reason for the shareholders' decision to suspend scheduled flights of the Tatra Air Corporation until the company's financial difficulties are settled and conditions are created for the establishment of a national air carrier.

At the recommendation of the Tatra Air Group's foreign legal advisers, the two Saab 340 aircraft that had been leased from abroad have been locked and bolted in a hangar. The stranded Tatra Air passengers have been carried by other air carriers and, in some cases, by the Slovak Government's JAK-40 aircraft. Tatra Air's domestic routes will be operated until the end of the month. Intensive negotiations are underway on ways of resolving the company's crisis. The Tatra Air Group has rejected the proposal of the Tatra Air Corporation management that the Tatra Air Corporation either be sold for the symbolic price of 1 Slovak koruna to Slovenska Pojistovna [Slovak Insurance Company], which is the main creditor of the Tatra Air Group, or that a capital stake by or sale to the Swiss Alphalines company be considered. The Alphalines company had arranged the lease of Tatra Air aircraft and, at the beginning of this year, its representatives joined the management of the Tatra Air Corporation. The foreign managers have, however, been recalled effective of the day of suspension of flight operations.

In a letter addressed to, among others, President Kovac, the employees of the Tatra Air Corporation express support for the foreign management, in which they see a guarantee for the development of a high-quality service. They ask for help in rescuing the company and demand the immediate resumotion of scheduled flights. They are convinced that the suspension of flights has greatly damaged the company's reputation abroad and that the company's bankruptcy had been planned. Podhorsky declared that after the completion of a financial analysis and the establishment of a national air carrier, a decision on which has been approved by the Slovak Government, the Tatra Air Group would bring in foreign shareholders to bail out the company. Tatra Air customers now use the services of the Vienna Airport or of the Czechoslovak Airlines [CSA], via Prague. In the meantime, the CSA has canceled its agreement on cooperation with Tatra Air, which provided for the sale of tickets for Tatra Air flights in CSA offices in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as well as in the network of CSA representatives in other countries.

Statistical Office Issues March Economy Figures

AU2705133493 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 25 May 93 p 3

[Report by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic: "The Economy of the Slovak Republic in March 1993"]

[Text] The efficiency of the main branches of the Slovak Economy was, under comparable conditions, the same in March as in February. The decline in output against the same period last year remains quite large, however.

Index

(The same period last year = 100)

Economic Sector	Jan	Feb	Mar	1st quarter
Industry—Total output	84.6	83.4	88.4	85.7
Enterprises With 25 or More Employees				
Total output	82.1	79.6	78.6	80.9
Total sales	78.2	80.6	86.9	81.5
Sales for exports	95.3	104.6	99.6	99.6
Construction				
Basic Building Output	84.1	78.7	82.5	81.7
Enterprises with more than 25 employees	62.5	59.2	66.9	63.2
Transportation				
Goods freight total	79.4	72.3	75.9	75.8
Road transportation	63.5	54.6	65.8	61.3
Road transportation of passengers	92.6	93.7	98.1	94.8
Agriculture				
Sales of beef cattle for slaughter	80.6	93.8	110.9	94.6
Sales of hogs for slaughter	82.0	91.7	111.2	95.1
Sales of poultry for slaughter	77.9	94.7	109.0	91.2
Milk	92.9	93.0	82.9	87.8
Eggs	80.5	84.2	116.3	92.6
Consumer Market				
Retail turnover and sales in current prices	127.1	129.2	131.4	129.4
In permanent prices	108.6	109.2	110.1	109.4
Foreign Trade				
Balance in millions of Slovak korunas	1,004.0	406.8	-182.0	1,229
Trade balance with Czech Republic	5.0	292.9	14.0	312

Note: The index is in comparable prices of 1993, or natural units, as the case may be; data on foreign trade are in millions of Slovak korunas.

In industry, the decline in production in March, compared with the same period last year, eased from 16.6 percent in February to 11.6 percent in March. Daily production in March was 9.4 percent higher than in February. In enterprises with 25 or more employees, the largest decline, against the first quarter last year, was in crude oil processing, manufacturing of transportation means, and food and condiments production. In the first quarter, the volume of sales declined in all sectors. The largest decline in sales was in the crude oil processing sector and the smallest in the mining of energy resources. In eight sectors, export sales were down on the first quarter of last year.

In the building industry in March, daily production was 0.7 percent higher compared with February. Since the beginning of the year, the decline in overall demand for construction works eased up to 18.3 percent (18.5 percent in two months).

In transportation in March, there were 6 percent more products transported daily than in February. However, overall demand for the transportation of goods was 24.2 lower than in the first quarter last year. Due to the longer transportation distance, output in road transportation in tonnes per kilometer were higher 14.8 percent.

While the average nominal monthly wage increased in basic sectors in the first quarter of the year, real wages were higher only in transportation.

Economic, Trade Ties With Slovenia To Expand

LD2605182793 Budapest MTI in English 1527 GMT 26 May 93

[Text] Budapest, May 26 (MTI)—Davorin Kracun, Slovenian deputy prime minister and minister of economic relations and development, held talks with Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations, in Budapest on Tuesday and Wednesday.

Both sides established that in the Central East European region, Hungary developed its trade ties most dynamically with Slovenia. Last year the value of two-way trade exceeded USD [U.S. dollars] 210 million, more than double the amount of the previous year. The turnover continued to increase even in the first few months of this year. Due to the growing number of small and medium-sized businesses involved and the governments' trade promotion actions, this trend is expected to be sustained in the long run.

Last year ten Slovenian companies opened representation offices, and three Hungarian-Slovenian joint ventures began operation in Hungary.

The politicians said it would prove expedient for the two countries to conclude agreements on investment protection and the elimination of double taxation.

They confirmed their interest in working out a free trade agreement and seeing it enter into force in 1994.

Winning Trade Union Chairman Views Elections

AU2605121093 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 24 May 93 p 5

[Interview with Sandor Nagy, chairman of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions, by Judit O-Varga; place and date not given: "Sandor Nagy: We Cooperate With the MSZP"]

[Text] *The campaign and results have both made it obvious that relations between the trade union federations cannot grow bitter. Even if we have debates, we must never be self-centered, Sandor Nagy claims. The National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] has become the absolute winner of the social security elections on 21 May. This is also probably a message for the parties. As for the possible change, I would only say that the domestic movement has more factions than necessary at the moment, there are more confederations than a small country can cope with. Hungary cannot maintain seven or eight confederations with viable strike funds and adequate expert teams.*

[O-Varga] How will the Hungarian trade union movement change in the wake of the election results?

[Nagy] The campaign and results have both made it obvious that relations between the trade union federations cannot grow bitter. Even if we have debates, we must never be self-centered. This in all probability is also a message for the parties. As for the possible change, I would say that the domestic movement has more factions than necessary at the moment and there are more confederations than a small country can cope with. Hungary cannot maintain seven or eight confederations with viable strike funds and adequate expert teams.

[O-Varga] Does this mean that less is more?

[Nagy] It is in the interest of all of us to face the facts.

[O-Varga] The work place is the real area of the trade unions. Up to now, we have had big deficiencies precisely in the classic work of protecting interests. Can we expect any change?

[Nagy] The importance of area trade unions will probably increase. An increasing number of small enterprises—simply because of their size—do not always tolerate the trade unions. On the other hand, the situation is also changing within the organization: Up to now, it has not been possible to strengthen the expert teams due to lack of finances and, often, to internal resistance, and we have had much debate on how to spend the membership fees. From now on, events in the organization will not be the internal affair of the MSZOSZ and our decisions will affect many people. Therefore, we will need a bigger expert team to prepare good decisions. Actually, in my view, the current detailed structure cannot be maintained within the organization, either; the future belongs to the bigger industrial unions.

[O-Varga] How important was the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP's] support in your victory?

[Nagy] Just as with the other trade unions, the party support contributed to the result. However, I do not think that the support was more than desirable.

[O-Varga] Can the MSZP expect similar support from the MSZOSZ in 1994?

[Nagy] Definitely. It is natural that this cooperation will be maintained.

[O-Varga] Will the international image of Hungarian trade unions change in the near future?

[Nagy] There will not be much change for the MSZOSZ because we already have good relations. However, our membership will probably be settled faster. Up to now, the European and world federations have been puzzled by what to do with seven or eight applicants for membership because they do not normally have so many members from one country. Usually two or three federations can join from one country. Now the international federations will be in a much better position to choose.

[O-Varga] The general meetings of the social security self-governments, the two 60-member bodies, will only have a few sessions a year. In the meantime, the two presidiums and the chairmen of the two bodies will represent the self-government. Is it possible that the

chairman of the MSZOSZ will soon also be the chairman of the pension insurance fund?

[Nagy] It is too early to talk about this. I do not have such ambitions, I already have plenty of work. Naturally, circumstances may go contrary to personal intentions.

Statistical Report Reflects 'Slump' in Economy

AU2605205293 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 26 May 93 p 8

["varga"-signed report: "Central Statistical Office Report on Economic Performance in 1993—Welfare Spending Has Increased One and a Half Times"]

[Text] The economic situation was characterized by two contradictory processes in the first months of 1993. On one hand, it seems that the decrease of production stopped, for example in industry, or the pace of decrease is becoming slower as, for example, in transport. On the other hand, exports changed for the worse, and investments decreased.

The dynamic increase of exports that we were used to in the past years stopped at the end of last year and has turned into a decrease now. Its value was 154 billion forints, which is a 22-percent decrease compared to the first three months of 1992. Compared to the 215 billion forints value of imports, it can be seen that the foreign trade balance shows approximately 60 billion forints deficit.

The decrease of exports was most significant in the area of agricultural products, which was due to the slump in domestic production. As "trouble never comes singly," the import of agricultural products considerably increased.

In addition to the foreign trade balance, the statisticians also prepare the balance of payments, which includes the data, for example, of tourism. More than 6 million foreigners crossed the Hungarian border in the first three months of 1993 which is 1 million more than in 1992. At first sight this seems to be very good, but the view changes when we add that the increase is mainly due to the increased number of transit passengers. In the meantime, somewhat fewer Hungarian citizens travelled abroad and the foreign tourism balance that is traditionally positive was better than in 1992.

It seems that industrial production has reached its lowest ebb, and it might not fall any more. The fact that the domestic market has stopped shrinking and exports have slightly increased are some of the most important reasons for this. Industries connected to clothing increased their output most. It is interesting how printing, press, and publishing activities expanded. Some metallurgical industries also increased their output, which was not very difficult because they had started from a rather low level. This, namely the big excess of capacities, continues to characterize the whole metallurgy. Mainly due to office technology and motor car production, engineering industry considerably increased its production. The growth in this sector is due to the sudden increase of exports, for example, some more Ikarus buses were sold in the markets of Soviet successor states.

According to the report of the Central Statistical Office, after the high increase in January, consumer prices increased to a lesser degree than a year before. In this month, the tax on most of those products that had had zero-percent tax increased to 6 percent. Prices were not affected by further central measures in the following months, therefore, prices in April were only 0.8 percent higher than in March, and the annual increase was 22.8 percent. In the past month, the price increase of durable goods was above the average, for example, the price of cars increased by 2.5 to 3 percent.

Welfare spending increased by more than 50 percent compared to last year while the population's cash income increased by an average 19 percent. The population's income from employment only increased by 12.5 percent, which resulted from the decrease of employment during the first three months and the moderate increase of incomes. The income of private enterprises increased by 18 percent which is more or less equal to the average increase. The stock of savings deposits reached 708 billion forints by the end of March 1993, which shows that the population has not lost its willingness to save.

No-Confidence Motion Against Suchocka Adopted

LD2805084793 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0800 GMT 28 May 93

[Excerpts] Within the last hour, the Sejm has recalled the cabinet of Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka. [passage omitted]

There were 445 deputies voting in all. The absolute majority required came to precisely 223 votes. The Hanna Suchocka government was literally just one vote short of surviving this vote. After the deputies left the Sejm chamber, after the announcement of a recess, everyone was asking who was responsible for the government losing by one vote. It transpired that the Christian-National Union [ZChN] Deputy Zbigniew Dyka [former justice minister in Suchocka's government] was quite simply late for the vote. Hence this result and not a different one.

During the recess, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka told journalists that it was very bad that the government was recalled and that the work that the government has undertaken was suspended in this way, and above all that work was suspended on the budget for next year.

Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka then said that presently there is no chance for the creation of a new coalition in the present Sejm, and that the opposition parties have no economic program. At the same time she added that on the basis of the Constitution, President Lech Walesa—for such was the question asked—must accept the dismissal of the prime minister's cabinet.

At the moment, the prime minister and President Lech Walesa have left the Sejm building and gone to the office of the Council of Ministers. A joint meeting of the Council of Ministers and President Lech Walesa will begin shortly or has begun already.

Suchocka Makes Statement

LD2805082593 Warsaw PAP in English 0814 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] Warsaw, May 28—Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka on Friday after the vote of no-confidence in her cabinet said that "the government lost only by one vote."

She reminded journalists of her yesterday's address in the Sejm in which she said that "there is no alternative coalition programme for this cabinet and works which this government has begun have been interrupted. The government has done much and started many things. I hope that the Sejm will work out an idea of a new government."

Sejm Rules Against Ostoja-Owsiany Candidacy

LD2805103393 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1000 GMT 28 May 93

[Program relayed by Warsaw Polonia TV]

[Text] The news just in. The Legislative Commission has adopted an opinion to the effect that a motion by the Confederation for Independent Poland [KPN] deputies to elect Andrzej Ostoja-Owsiany as prime minister, which was tabled right after a motion on no-confidence in Hanna Suchocka's government had been passed, is legally inadmissible in light of the constitution. In practice this means that, according to the Commission, this motion should not be voted on in the Sejm.

Walesa Decision on Suchocka 'Not Clear'

LD2805104793 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1000 GMT 28 May 93

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[Text] Half an hour after the Sejm voted on the no-confidence motion, an extraordinary meeting of the government commenced at the Office of the Council of Ministers, with the participation of President Walesa. Prime Minister Suchocka tendered her resignation. It is not clear whether the president will accept it or whether he will dissolve the parliament.

Hanna Suchocka tendered her resignation to the president during an extraordinary meeting of the government. The deliberations, which lasted for more than two and a half hours, were also attended by representatives of the coalitional parliamentary clubs. Sejm Speaker Wieslaw Chrzanowski came to the Office of the Council of Ministers at 1100 hours. Politicians and officials who left the room for a moment during the deliberations did not want to say in what direction the discussion was heading. Half an hour ago, Lech Walesa, Hanna Suchocka, and Wieslaw Chrzanowski left the building by a side entrance. The prime minister's press secretary told the journalists waiting outside the meeting room that the president has commenced the actions envisaged by the Constitution. So in deciphering this enigmatic statement it is possible to state that the Constitution envisages in Article 66 that the president may accept the resignation of Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka or else dissolve parliament. The decision has still not been made.

Walesa Rejects Suchocka Resignation

LD2805110193 Warsaw Fourth Program Radio Network in Polish 1050 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] President Lech Walesa has sent a letter to the Sejm speaker in which he informs him that he is not accepting Hanna Suchocka's cabinet resignation.

SLD Leader Kwasniewski Criticizes Government

WS2705130993 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 0803 GMT 27 May 93

[Address by Aleksander Kwasniewski, head of the Left Democratic Union, SLD, at the Sejm debate on the no-confidence vote in the government, in Warsaw on 27 May—live]

[Text] The SLD deputies are joining this debate with a heavy heart, because the decision to be made is difficult and weighty. This is why we have conducted serious consultations with our constituencies in order to learn their opinion. On the other hand, I feel hypocrisy hanging in the atmosphere when I listen to Solidarity Deputy Pietrzyk. I remember initiatives that this legislative committee came up with in a bid to form this government, as well as its statements about being a midwife to the new coalition and the government. I am surprised how quickly the Solidarity committee wants to turn to its grave-digger. [moderate applause heard in the room]. I also remember how they approved the budget, which we opposed, and then staged protest actions together with the budget-financed sphere, embittered by the budgetary decisions. I consider as hypocritical those statements and deeds intended to put such pressure on the Sejm that every decision that deviates from Solidarity's agenda will be countered by a general strike. This is an attitude that no one can accept, and is one which inflicts damage. And it is the Solidarity members, legislative committee, and the Solidarity trade union that should be held responsible for these damages. As I was listening to Deputy Pietrzyk, I sadly realized that nothing but a moustache is left over from the old glory days of Solidarity. [laughter and applause]

The decision is difficult and weighty, because we are dealing with a crisis. We realize that the transformation process is extremely arduous, and that in both Poland and Eastern Europe an unprecedented experiment is taking place. We also see the lingering burdens and various holdover instititions from bygone days, which call for profound reform. Today, however, it is becoming obvious that you cannot use the past as a universal excuse. And it is even more surprising that right-wing deputies speak of the ruin inherited from the previous system, and at the same time they lament about the theft of national property. Make up your mind, gentlemen—unless you are talking about looting the remnants of our national wealth.

After the last four years, one should appreciate our accomplishments, achieved by all Poles: newly created democratic institutions, a favorable environment for private initiative, openness to the world. Regardless of the political situation or government, these values should be protected and fostered. The current political and economic crisis is continuing. There is no need to say more, since our debate today deals with the point that we have reached. The lack of any strategy on the part of the authorities, their favoring ad hoc and tactical measures, the lack of a new Constitution, the inefficiency of government institutions—these are the facts of the recent times. In this sense, I approve of Deputy Pietrzyk's constructive self-criticism.

With the crisis still going on, signs of economic improvement, mentioned by Ms. Suchocka, have began to appear. In our point of view, these signals were not generated by the government's actions. A couple of years ago, we heard about the concept that the best economic policy is the lack of one. And very recently, a high-ranking politician, responsible for economic matters in the government, declared that the most important thing is that Poland should be Catholic rather than wealthy and prosperous. Since the slight upturn was not prompted by the government, we will soon face an economic slump, which we have been battling against for years. A drop in exports should already be a major cause for concern. The construction industry is affected by the slowdown. Half of the enterprises report financial losses. People's incomes are falling as a result of marginal wage indexation and frozen wages in the budget sphere, undermining the demand, the market, and, consequently, production. The rate of inflation remains one of the highest in Europe, and no economist would agree to attribute excess demand as the reason for it. All these bad signals can soon deteriorate and become more aggravating to society than they are now.

The social crisis is continuing. Social alienation is so conspicuous that you do not have to resort to public opinion polls to prove it. Marginal voter turnouts, the frustration of a considerable section of society and—what is especially dangerous—the frustration of the young people, which can be traced to unfulfilled promises and the disappointment of the past and the present alike. One should unequivocally state that it is the Solidarity-spawned elite—which has neither a strategic program nor the ability to act efficiently—that is responsible for the current economic and social crisis. This elite has squandered an immense credit of social trust and patience. Solidarity—an historical movement that changed the system—has proven itself incompetent and incapable of rallying the support of society around national issues.

As an opposition party, the SLD has assessed and continues to assess the Suchocka government with a full dose of criticism. When the government was being formed, we pointed to the exotic nature of its coalition, unable to hammer out a coherent program. We warned the prime minister, just like legislative commissions did, against the incompetence of some of the ministerial candidates.

As this government carried out its policy, we could see time passing by; we could see there were more efforts to achieve a greater unanimity of the coalition than there were to find systematic solutions in the most fundamental problem areas. We pointed to the various weaknesses and the lack of realism in the budget bill, which was unfortunately adopted in this chamber. However, we also appreciated some of the initiatives, such as the Pact on State Companies. They went beyond the routine; they were systematic; they pertained to the most vital matters of the country and of the people; they were formulated in consultation with opposition parties and trade unions. This is what should be continued, no matter what government there is.

The SLD still does not have the ambition to take any official office or to be part of a government coalition that

is a result of this contract. We are unsure about how to act during tomorrow's voting because we have the following questions: Does the current government guarantee that the affairs of the executive authorities will be [word indistinct] to the next election? Is it able to do this without endangering the country and the people? Is it prepared to reject those elements of its policy that have not proved themselves? Can it take a concrete position on the strategic suggestions made by us many times on this podium?

Despite all our criticism of the government's activities, we volunteered to hold talks on issues that we believed to be particularly significant and urgent. In each of the submitted issues, there were constructive proposals for solutions. We were ready to talk with the government. The government coalition was not willing to conduct such a dialogue. A proposal for holding negotiations was presented to the public as being blackmail and an ultimatum. This is not true. Was there really nothing to talk about? Is it really no use thinking about how to find resources to satisfy the elementary needs of the budget-financed employees? Is it not possible to analyze jointly how to improve tax and customs duty collection, to consider the existing possibilities of correcting the budget, so that it does not jeopardize the state? After all, it was the government which put forth suggestions concerning the possibilities for increasing the national revenues.

The financial condition of companies and the results of foreign trade and in the housing sector indicate that the positive signs of an economic recovery last year could only have been temporary, and that they did not result from any systematic measures. Does this mean that it was not worthwhile to discuss possible alternative solutions regarding the credit policy and investments?

Was it really not worthwhile to think together how to spend money for the program of aid for the unemployed, which would allow these people to find new jobs? Was it not worthwhile to think about what this program should consist of? Should we really have waited for so long for a decree concerning relief for the regions that are particularly threatened by unemployment—that is, from October to July, because the decree will come into effect at the beginning of July.

Another thing: Many apartments are empty because the people, who have been waiting for years to get them have no money to buy them. The apartments are a financial burden on the housing societies, which are, in turn, in arrears with their payments to local budgets as well as the central budget. Does the fact that the government is not interested in this problem show that this government is responsible?

The number of the employees in the ministries increased from 46,000 to 60,000 people within a year; there are already 82 deputy ministers and under secretaries of state. In view of these figures, is the proposal to curb the buildup of the bureaucracy really so trifling? Even if this does not result in cutting down expenses, someone must set a good example. I think that it should be the central administration.

When a candidate for one or another governmental post is sought, where the only criterion is the membership in the right party, is it so terrible that we should want a cadre policy that would be based on substantive qualifications?

These were the proposals that could have been discussed, but were not. Here, I should like to express my respect for the pragmatism and political refinement of the prime minister, who, until the very end, was trying to start talks with the opposition, despite efforts from within her own ranks to prevent it.

Today the most fundamental question we are facing is not only how to vote on the no-confidence vote motion, but also what the future has in store for Poland. I would like to say that the risk involved in various solutions that are unknown today is rather great. However, this is a great test for the democratic institutions that have been established since 1989. We will find out how they will survive this difficult situation. Will the winners be the good of the state and the people? Or will the winner be a willingness to achieve a national consensus? Or will these structures propose another wave of political egoism, gang warfare, and internal squabbling? Today this test will be necessary; it will be taken. The grade, however, will be granted by the people.

However, I must disagree when I hear that one of the arguments, which is supposedly being taken seriously, is the threat of all kinds of presidential solutions. These threats are coming from former collaborators, former advisers, people who organized the president's electoral campaign—people who, quite recently, and with the help of group photos, opened the door to their political careers. This is unfair; this boils down to taking no responsibility for what has been going on in Poland since 1989.

The SLD is convinced that all the budding democratic institutions will live up to their constitutional roles so that they will best serve the public interest. Are there any alternative programs? The prime minister also spoke about this, finding various alternative concepts rather dubious.

The SLD also has alternative programs that are aimed at developing the market economy, and at the same time include measures for social protection. This issue also deserves a discussion. However, the misconception that there is no alternative and the misguided belief that anyone occupying a government post will automatically promote reforms, take responsibility, and be patriotic is one of the underlying reasons for the absence of a serious dialogue and the lack of consideration for different solutions, including alternative ones. In the face of a burned-out political alignment and in light of the discrepancy between public sentiment and the makeup of the legislature, one should turn directly to the society so

that it may determine which alternative programs to choose, and evaluate the activities of different political groupings, as well as their platforms and their ramifications. This can only be implemented through new elections based on the new electoral system. This issue should be examined in a responsible manner by all political parties present in the legislature—and not in the lobbies. Poland needs change and stability. And it is only through elections and the political calendar that this change and the concept of economic development, suitable for Poland, can be achieved. This is the only thing that can rescue the country from political schizophrenia.

Having considered all pros and cons, and with a sense of responsibility, the SLD deputies will vote in favor of removing the Suchocka government.

Walesa Sees Greater Role for Local Government

LD2705212493 Warsaw PAP in English 2109 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Warsaw, May 27—In a statement for the Polish press agency PAP President Lech Walesa said that "a self-governing Polish republic is still a distant goal" and the "local government bodies should realize their power and become a respected and responsible partner for the state administration."

Walesa made the statement in connection with the third anniversary Thursday of the first elections to local government bodies held in post-communist Poland.

"Three years ago, on election day, we had hopes for a different Poland," the president said. "Today we realize that a self-governing republic is still a distant goal."

"Legislative work is needed that would improve the effectiveness of local government," Walesa went on. "It should be independent and bold, innovative and energetic. It must represent the interests of local communities. If the local government succeeds, then Poland will also succeed," the president stressed.

SdRP's Kwasniewski Views Political Scene

AU2605163193 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22-23 May 93 p 7

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland, SdRP, by Ryszard Rybus; place and date not given: "We Have All Won"]

[Excerpts] [Rybus] Who will be the next president?

[Kwasniewski] I do not know. The elections will no doubt be different from the ones in 1990. There will be fewer candidates. They should have the support of more than one party.

[Rybus] In one interview (PRZGELAD TYGODNIOWY Issue 12, 1993), you did not exclude the possibility that you, too, might find yourself in the Belvedere. Are you that optimistic about the left?

[Kwasniewski] No. Quite simply, there are questions that reporters ask that cannot be answered except in a diplomatic manner. We are still not considering the question of presidential elections, which are still a long way off. Last time our candidate was Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, but one has to look for a candidate outside the framework of one party. If I or another one of us could be such a candidate, that would be marvelous. However, I think it is still too soon for that.

[Rybus] But the fact is that less than four years after the "Solidarity" victory, reporters are putting that question to you.

[Kwasniewski] That shows the extent of disappointment with the government camp and the acceleration that we have noted in public life. Following 1989 and the dissolution of the Polish United Workers Party, we decided that certain processes would take a long time, many years.

[Rybus] Who has won over the past four years?

[Kwasniewski] It is hard to say whether some significant social or political group has achieved success. If one were to listen to the Poles, who are skeptical by nature, then one could get the impression that there are no victors, because everyone has lost out.

However, I do not think that things are that bad. We have all won regarding those issues that we have managed to solve. Nevertheless, there are significantly more issues, and more people have become losers than we expected four years ago. [passage omitted]

[Rybus] Programmatic differences within the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland [SdRP] are beginning to enter the public arena. Differing assessments within the party regarding government privatization bills are just one example. You represent a tendency within the SdRP that is associated with the slogan "invite us to the table."

[Kwasniewski] It is surely entirely normal that in leading the party, I am doing all I can to be treated as an effective participant in public life. This was particularly important when, following the elections, there were calls for our isolation. Today, I can say with satisfaction that the boycott of the SLD Club [not further identified] has failed, and it has failed on three levels. The attempt at social isolation has failed; on the contrary, we are gaining increasing support among voters. After a year, one could no longer have talked about the isolation of our deputies in the Sejm. Their work on many commissions is valued, and their skills are even praised by opponents of the SdRP. Finally, the attempt at political isolation has

failed, because on fundamental issues—privatization was such an issue—serious talks had to be held with us after all.

So, the advocates of isolation lost, and I have the satisfaction that the SdRP is being talked about normally more and more, that we are not being viewed solely as an "outsider."

In addition, the long and detailed discussion in our club about privatization shows that there has been an important evolution in the attitudes of the democratic left in Poland. The charges leveled at us about being a party of political revisionism, of nostalgia for the Polish People's Republic, a party that rejects the changes that are taking place, are at odds with the truth. Thus, I would be more inclined to expect recognition for our pro-reform attitude, which is something that we often have to explain to our voters. [passage omitted]

[Rybus] Are you afraid of the emergence of a bipartisan political system, in which the part of society that is pleased with the effects of the reforms will generally back the Democratic Union and the liberals, whereas the votes of people who are frustrated will be gathered up by the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the center-right, while in this situation the SdRP will remain a party representing one community, a party that is meant to keep up the spirits of former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] members?

[Kwasniewski] You have to begin by asking the following question: Will there be a growing need for parties that have real programs, propose real recipes, or will there be an increase in demagogy and populism? If the first tendency triumphs—and I believe that it will—a chance will be created for serious parties. If, one the other hand, as a result of the government's ineffectiveness, the pauperization of society, the undermining of state structures the other option triumphs, then no group that fails to exploit demagogy and populism will stand a chance.

I think that if someone promises that wages will be doubled tomorrow, then he is just a plain liar. I do not want to find myself in such a role.

I am also not afraid that we will become the party of one community. I am, however, afraid that—like other parties that have a program—we might find ourselves in a difficult situation if a wave of populism sweeps across Poland, and a populist reaction might—let us hope it does not—affect us. The most important question then will be how to act, because the kind of idea proposed by the president—that he will be the first to march to the Belvedere—is absurd. [passage omitted]

[Rybus] You are fond of speaking warmly of Bill Clinton. Do you feel that there is a need in Poland for this kind of dynamic left-wing politician?

[Kwasniewski] I do not know whether Bill Clinton would be delighted about being considered a politician of the left.

[Rybus] Considering actual conditions in America...

[Kwasniewski] Well, yes. I feel an affinity for Clinton, because we are of a similar generation. He is eight years older than I am, but there is a link between us at least in terms of the music that we listened to. However, what is more important is that during his election campaign he exposed the weakness of the new liberal doctrine with its belief in self-regulation. I agree with him on programmatic points when he stresses the harmonious development of society. One cannot look solely at industry and technology when poverty is increasing and crime is rising.

[Rybus] To return to Poland, you did not say who would be in the Belvedere in a few years, but perhaps I will put it differently: Which political tendency will be in power?

[Kwasniewski] First, the political scene will become much less fragmented than at present. The political setup will become more intelligible. Second, it seems to me that over a longer period of time we will be destined to have coalition structures of government. No one political force will be predominant. Third, because there will have to be coalitions, there are two possibilities: a center-right coalition, which, in my opinion, will evolve around a new form of Christian democracy, or a center-left coalition, which will include the UD [Democratic Union] and the SdRP.

[Rybus] So do you believe that the classic Western European party system will develop in our country?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, definitely.

Parliament Demands Russia Stop Tiraspol 'Farce'

AU2805063093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1520 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 27/5/1993—"We are witnessing these days a juridical frame-up against a group of citizens of the Republic of Moldova [passage indistinct] the juridical farce in Tiraspol turns it into a political trial. The authorities instated by force with the aid of obscure forces, encouraged by the presence in the region of the 14th occupation Army, in a territory belonging by right to the sovereign state of Moldova, are illegitimate.

"What has and is happening now in Tiraspol is clear evidence of an act of aggression against a sovereign and independent state.

"The charges brought against these citizens of the Republic of Moldova, accused of being Romanian and patriots, are but hostile acts against the Romanian people, run counter to the general principles of law, hurt the Romanians' national dignity and harm the relations between our states.

"The Parliament of Romania, while taking note of the medieval practices the trial is being conducted by, with the defendants held captive in iron cages, is hereby cautioning those who now back the illegitimate authorities in Tiraspol that the assassination they are now preparing is an act of hostility against the Romanian people, a grave offence against humanity.

"Considering that the president and the Parliament of the Russian Federation are attached to the democratic values, the Romanian Parliament is requesting them to urgently and firmly intercede for having this monstrous set-up stopped."

Opposition Criticizes Iliescu Remarks

AU2705195293 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 25 May 93 p 2

[Cristian Oprea article: "The Opposition's Opinion: Mr. Iliescu Should Also Read the Constitution Now and Then"]

[Text] Radu Vasile, senator, spokesman of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party: "Mr. Iliescu's statement according to which the problems linked to corruption were a sort of maneuver by the opposition against the government, while the censure motion and the negative vote on the draft budget were a chain of actions by the opposition, which has not proved to be a constructive move, lacks any real grounds. The phenomenon of corruption has not been created by the opposition. The opposition has not caused this phenomenon. The fact that corruption is viewed as a subversive action of the opposition proves that the attempt to seek the truth will hardly have any chance of success."

Sergiu Cunescu, deputy, president of the Social Deomcratic Party of Romania: "Mr. Iliescu's statement on Romanian television does not surprise me any more because we are used to his instigations. President Iliescu should also read the Constitution now and then to realize that his actions should be moderating and not instigating actions. We do not agree with his attitude according to which—as he announced immediately after the revolution—he favors an original democracy, just as Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej [Ceausescu's predecessor] wanted to achieve a new type of democracy. His move actually aims at influencing people; it is a new attempt to instill fear in our society and to influence state bodies, which have precise tasks within the framework of the Constitution."

Adrian Severin, deputy, vice president of the National Salvation Front: "I regret that the president has abandoned his equidistant position and his role of moderator to side with the government coalition. The president is not part of the government team, but is the president of all Romanians. His criticism voiced against the opposition is just another pretext to cover up the tremendous governing mistakes at this point. It seems that everybody wants to hamper the government in its activity: the former king, former capitalists, former landowners, ethnic minorities, and international financial bodies. The blockage on the part of the opposition does not exist. What the national economy blocks is the very policy promoted by the current government. Those who so far shouted louder than anyone else against corruption are the most liable to be revealed as corrupt if serious investigations are made. So far, the president has not seen fit to calm down those who accused preceding governments of corruption. Now that possible acts of corruption by the representatives of the current executive power have been brought to light, the president believes—for the first time—that he might face a diversion."

Dinu Patriciu, deputy, leader of the Liberal Party: "What we think of the affirmations made by Mr. Iliescu is that this is a new diversion, which the president does all the time, and eventually he will end up by losing his credibility. Today, the class enemy has been replaced by the opposition. Half measures in politics are the cause of corruption. The fact that the president spoke before the courts did is anticonstitutional and even an attempt to influence them. For the time being, the president is unable to change his mentality of first secretary [of the Communist Party] into that of a president of a democratic country. I hope, however, that he will do so, because otherwise he will push the country into a very serious political crisis."

Article Examines Delay of Foreign Loans

AU2805132693 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 24 May 93 p 3

[Gilda Lazar article: "A Lost Year for Romania"]

[Text] An international crisis committee will meet today to prepare for a new meeting with the major foreign

creditors—the EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development], IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], IMF, and EIB [European Investments Bank]—that will take place in Bucharest on 26-27 May. As I said before, the recent visit paid by Messrs. Negritoiu, Isarescu, and Georgescu to Brussels was not a great success.

On the one hand, the parliament, dominated by the FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front] and its extremist satellites, did not approve any law that could support the reform. On the other hand, the executive power has only declared its intentions, without taking any concrete measures, although—six months after they took over—it was bound by duty to "give account" on the way it administered the economy. All of these are of greater importance than the theoretical documents presented in Brussels, especially since there is no guarantee for the implementation of provisions included in them.

The EBRD mission that visited Bucharest on 16-18 May again drew attention to the importance of reducing backwardness. The World Bank loan, which is currently under negotiation and is designated to assist structural adjustment, is connected with concrete commercial reforms and investments. Not even the most important stand-by with the IMF, postponed so often, has any chance to be concluded this year.

We wish to remind everybody that the IMF recommended a budgetary deficit level of 2-2.5 percent of the GIP [gross industrial product]. The approved deficit is 4 percent and the accumulated fiscal deficit is 5.6 percent, which will increase because of the recent concessions made by the government to the trade unions for the elimination of subsidies. Regarding the liberalization of the currency exchange rate, this is out of the question, although the dollar exchange rate increased from 615 to 635 lei, probably with the view of meeting with "donors." The international financial fora predict a 15-percent increase in unemployment and a real explosion of criminality, especially after the value-added tax is introduced and also probably when the government makes new salary concessions.

From the outside, one can clearly see that from the viewpoint of economic stability, this year is lost for Romania and one can even note that the provisions included in the government program have been cut from reality. This week, parallel with the cup-match of journalists in Bucharest, the return match of the "cup-match of credits" will also be played. If the government team loses the game, then most certainly many "red cards" will be shown.

Increasingly larger circles believe that the first to be affected will be the "captain" of the team of reform promoters, namely Misu Negritoiu, whose mission is considered finished after the elaboration of the strategy, and he will be blamed for this lack of success. In fact, through Ioan Solcanu's statements, the idea of a government that includes pure-bred FDSN members has been officially released. It is useless to ask who will eventually be the loser.

'Black List' of Bankrupt Enterprises Published

AU2705100093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0819 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 27/5/1993—Government experts have drawn up the first "black list" of bankrupt enterprises in Romania, which will be put under a special regime of financial control, hoping to avoid their final closure. The list contains about 39 economic agents [companies] with state capital.

Top on the list is the Bucharest giant IMGB (heavy machine building enterprise of Bucharest), whose outstanding payments are 8.7 times bigger than its annual revenues. In other words, IMGB ought to work eight years and seven months from now on to pay its debts while buying nothing. The list also includes other big industrial combines in chemistry, petrochemistry, aeronautics, and so on.

Ionita Vifor, director in the Ministry of Industries, said: "As the government completed the list, the Ministry of Industries has decided that, besides giving them special financial assistance, it would also survey in point of management the evolution of the respective enterprises, hoping to avoid, if possible, their final closure."

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 28 May
WA2805162693

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Sarajevo demilitarization talks cancelled due to Bosnian Serb absence ... Bosnian Serbs claim UNPROFOR helping reinforce Muslims ... Muslims, Serbs reportedly fire on UNPROFOR trucks ... Muslims say Croats trying to provoke clashes in Mostar ... NATO records at least nine violations of no-fly zone over Bosnia.

MILITARY

SARAJEVO TALKS CANCELLED (Sarajevo Radio, Zagreb Radio): Talks on demilitarization of Sarajevo cancelled after Bosnian Serb commander fails to show up. Talks reportedly stalemated over how far Serbian artillery should withdraw from city. (AU2805105993, LD2805114093)

SERBS SAY UNPROFOR AIDING MUSLIMS (TANJUG): Bosnian Serbs protest that UNPROFOR allowed Muslims to fly "fresh troops and ammunition" to northern Bosnia with UNPROFOR approval, making "the neutrality" of the peacekeeping forces open to "question."

MUSLIMS, SERBS FIRE ON UNPROFOR (Pale Radio, Sarajevo Radio): Sarajevo Radio reports Serbs "have again opened fire" on UNPROFOR in Brcko, but "no casualties reported." Bosnian Serb forces say UNPROFOR driver en route to Sarajevo ran over Serbian soldier when he lost control of truck after "Muslim soldiers fired in his direction." (AU2805090693, LD2805113693)

MUSLIMS REPORT SHELLING (Sarajevo Radio): Sarajevo Radio says Croats trying "to provoke clashes" with Bosnian Army in Mostar by firing mortar shells in "densely- populated" Muslim "residential districts." (AU2805120093)

NATO RECORDS NO-FLY VIOLATIONS (AFP): NATO aircraft report nine "certified" and 22 "probable" violations of Bosnian no-fly zone since monitoring began on 12 April. (AU2805075093)

HAVEN SOUGHT IN MAGLAJ (AFP): UNPROFOR spokeswoman says Maglaj, scene of recent Serbian shelling, should be "placed under UN protection," making it seventh UN-protected "safe haven." Spokeswoman reports Serbs dropping average of "one shell every ten minutes" on town. (AU2705150493)

HUMANITARIAN

SREBRENICA SUFFERS WATER SHORTAGE (TANJUG): UNPROFOR spokesman warns of "serious problems with water supply" in Srebrenica, local Muslims authorities "considering evacuating refugees." (LD2805124893)

Serbs Fire on UNPROFOR Members Near Brcko

AU2805090693

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 28 May carries in its regular 13-minute newscast three reports on fighting in the republic.

Reporting from Maglaj, Hajrudin Sermic says that "the crimes against the population are continuing. Since 1925 [1725 GMT] until 2200 last night, the Chetniks pounded the town with howitzers from their stronghold in (?Todorovici). Several people were wounded in this attack. There is a frightening quiet this morning."

In his report from Brcko, Hamiz Deronjic says that "the Serbian Chetniks have again opened fire on the UNPROFOR members on this front. Yesterday's provocations by the aggressor culminated at approximately 1600, when the Chetniks directed two Praga barrages at the UNPROFOR vehicles that were moving along the (?Vitrovici)- (?Kupik)-(?Ulovic)-(?Brka) route. There were no casualties among the UN observers." He said that "the Chetniks started shelling the defense positions last night with 60-mm mortars and an antiaircraft gun and later used 82-mm mortars. Around 1800 yesterday evening, the enemy from Ulice fired with 82-mm mortars and a recoilless gun at Bajici. The attack on the central part of the Brcko defense began with strong small arms fire and with fire from a 40-mm antiaircraft gun from Suljagic Sokak against Licki Most. The Chetnik mortars pounded Licki Most, Rijeke, Dizdarusa, and Omerbegovaca all night."

The Gradacac Information Center reports on a very poor line that "the 15-day-long cease-fire on this front is still in force, even though there is some provocative small arms fire."

Muslim Fire on UNPROFOR Trucks Causes Two Deaths

LD2805113693 Pale Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Studio-S Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] Serb soldier Sveto Colovic was killed when a UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] truck, which was transporting humanitarian aid to the Muslim part of Sarajevo, hit him near the Osmica Hotel in the Zlatiste area at 0900 hours this morning.

The driver of the UNPROFOR truck claims he lost control of the vehicle, which swerved off the road, when Muslim soldiers fired in his direction.

This is the second time that Muslim forces opened fire on UNPROFOR vehicles in less than 24 hours. A UNPROFOR truck driver was killed on the same section of the road last night when he was hit by bullets fired by Muslim soldiers. Muslim forces launched an attack on Serb positions in the Zlatiste area from all available weapons around 0400 hours this morning. The attack continued unabating throughout the morning.

Military Talks on Sarajevo Demilitarization Canceled

AU2805095093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] We have learned at the Sarajevo UNPROFOR Headquarters that today's talks on the demilitarization of Sarajevo have been canceled. The talks should have been attended by Sefer Halilovic, commander of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Milivoj Petkovic, commander of the Croatian Defense Council Headquarters, and the war criminal Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serbian forces.

The statement by UNPROFOR says that the reason for the cancellation of the talks lies in the [word indistinct] conditions set by the aggressor's side. According to the same source, the meeting between Sefer Halilovic and Milivoj Petkovic will be held in the presence of General Philip Morillon.

Mladic Fails To Attend

AU2805105993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 May 93

[Zoran Pirolic report from Sarajevo]

[Text] The long-awaited negotiations between the military commanders of the three sides on turning Sarajevo into a safe haven will not begin today. We could have guessed that after yesterday's failed talks within the mixed military group at Sarajevo airport when, as [UNPROFOR's] Barry Frewer said today, differences were expressed on the proposals for turning Sarajevo into a safe haven under UN control.

Instead of tripartite talks at Sarajevo's UNPROFOR headquarters, bilateral talks began about an hour ago between Sefer Halilovic, commander of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and Brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, commander of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] headquarters. The negotiations are being coordinated by General Philip Morillon, commander of the blue helmets in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The war criminal Ratko Mladic, commander of the aggressor's army, has not arrived for talks for unknown reasons. UNPROFOR says that the explanation given was that the general has more important things to do at the moment. What [words indistinct].

As we have found out unofficially, the differences between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO in turning Sarajevo into a safe haven are insignificant, but nevertheless they do exist. The talks between Halilovic and Petkovic today will deal only with this issue, Frewer told us.

The mixed military group will continue negotiations in the days to come, but expectations have been diminished. It appears that the main bone of contention is the withdrawal of the aggressor's heavy artillery from the city. Point four of Security Council Resolution 824 directly insists on the withdrawal of all military and paramilitary units of the

Bosnian Serbs to a distance from Sarajevo from which they will not be able to jeopardize its security. The Serbian aggressor side will try to outwit this, as the examples of Srebrenica and Zepa show, so it is highly unlikely that the talks on turning Sarajevo into a safe haven will be completed any time soon without more pressure from the international community, and the deployment of a larger contingent of foreign troops in this city.

During the night and this morning, fierce artillery exchanges took place in several parts of Sarajevo, particularly in the old and central parts, and in Grbavica. UNPROFOR claims that this is not the reason why Mladic did not come for today's talks.

Serb-Croat-Muslim Talks End; No Agreement

LD2805003693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2147 GMT 27 May 93

[Excerpts] Pale, 27 May (TANJUG)—Talks on the demilitarization of Sarajevo held between the mixed army commissions of the three warring sides in former Bosnia-Herzegovina ended without an agreement this evening after nine hours.

General Milan Gvero, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Serb republic army, told Serb republic television this evening that the talks referred to the establishment of a security zone within Muslim-controlled parts of Sarajevo and in keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 824. In Gvero's words, "the main obstacles were disagreements about the demarcation line between the warring sides on the Sarajevo front."

The Serb side insisted that the security zones should be set up in such a way that they would not be to the detriment of the Serb people and Serb territories while, said Gvero, Muslim demands were concerned with "the limit which the Serb side cannot accept."

Stressing that Muslims insisted that these security zones be established earlier and that the Muslims were now against this concept, Gvero said that the Serb side supported the demilitarization process and was prepared to resume the talks. He explained that different words were used to describe the security zone, but that the main definition was established by the Geneva Convention. According to the Convention, said Gvero, the security zone was that zone inside which civilians—women, children, and the elderly—were protected and no armed persons were allowed inside as a rule.

The Muslim side insisted, however, that the Muslim Army remain within the security zones, that Serb forces withdraw from their present positions and that only the Serb artillery be placed under control. It also insisted on the opening of certain corridors, i.e. "blue routes." [passage omitted]

Apart from Gvero, the Serb delegation at Sarajevo airport talks included Colonel Cedo Sladoje. The Muslim side was represented by Jovan Divjak, Mustafa Hajrulahovic-Talijan, and Ismet Dahic and the Croatian side by Vinko Lucic, Zoran Kapetanovic, Slavko Zelic, and Ivan Vulic.

The talks were conducted with the mediation of United Nations Protection Forces representatives led by Gen Heis.

Appeal To Declare Maglaj 'Safe Area'

AU2705150493 Paris AFP in English 1447 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Zagreb, May 27 (AFP)—United Nations peacekeepers Thursday called for the key northern Bosnian town of Maglaj, under daily bombardment from Serb forces, to be declared a United Nations "safe area" like six other Moslem enclaves in Bosnia.

The U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) believed Maglaj should be "placed under U.N. protection," because the town was being shelled "an average of 50 times a day by the Serbs, which amounts to one shell about every 10 minutes," said UNPROFOR spokeswoman Shannon Boyd.

Boyd said UNPROFOR was "very concerned" about the situation in Maglaj, where a large number of children and injured were suffering food shortages.

She said the town was likely to become the next place in Bosnia critically in need of humanitarian aid.

Fighting continued in the Brcko and Maglaj areas of northern Bosnia Thursday, U.N. military spokesman Barry Frewer said.

Serb forces are pushing to clear a corridor linking Serbia in the east with Serb-held parts of Croatia in the west across Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Alemka Lisinski, spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Zagreb, said Thursday that the situation in Maglaj was "catastrophic," with 32,000 Moslem and Croat civilians lacking food and medical supplies.

Amateur radio operators reporting from the town said that the civilian population was terrorised and local authorities were pleading with UNPROFOR to deploy troops there to stop the barbaric acts.

If the U.N. Security Council declared it a "safe area" Maglaj would join the six other Moslem enclaves of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica and Bihac covered by resolution 824.

In a rare opportunity for some of Sarajevo's 300,000 residents to leave, 400 Macedonian citizens were evacuated Thursday from the Bosnian capital, besieged by Serb forces, the Bosnian government information office said.

They were to be taken from Sarajevo airport to Lukavica, a Serb-held suburb to the southwest and from there by bus to Macedonia.

Serb, Croat and Moslem military leaders are due to meet at Sarajevo airport Friday in a bid to demilitarize Sarajevo.

In Srebrenica in the east there was small arms and machine gun fire at front-line positions between the defending Moslems and besieging Serbs.

U.N. military spokesman Barry Frewer said refugees who had crowded by the tens of thousands into Srebrenica were forced to stand in line for up to two hours to get water, and the Serbs had denied U.N. engineering teams access to fix a filtration plant.

UN Spokesman on Maglaj, Sarajevo, Srebrenica

AU2705170893 Paris AFP in English 1651 GMT 27 May 93

[Michael Adler report]

[Text] Sarajevo, May 27 (AFP)—Fighting continued at the key northern town of Maglaj in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina Thursday while the situation worsened in Srebrenica in the east, with water in short supply, U.N. military spokesmen said.

Maglaj, home to some 32,000 Moslem and Croatian civilians, was apparently the newest target of a Serbian offensive that is clearing out pockets of Moslem resistance one-by-one in northern and eastern Bosnia.

Serbs are pushing to clear a corridor across Bosnia-Herzegovina linking Serbia in the east with Serb-held parts of Croatia in the west.

The attack on Srebrenica was stopped when the United Nations declared it a safe haven and sent troops there but the health situation was on Thursday desperate, with water in short supply and epidemics threatening, U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Commander Barry Frewer said in Sarajevo.

In Zagreb, UNPROFOR spokesmen said Maglaj was shelled Thursday afternoon for the 11th straight day. They said local officials reported the Serb offensive had left 11 dead and 60 seriously wounded.

A team of U.N. military observers entered Maglaj Wednesday but were having problems moving around due to the heavy shelling.

The observers said heavy artillery 155 mm and 105 mm shells were falling every 10 or 15 minutes on the town.

The civilians in Maglaj suffer "cruelly" from a lack of food and medicine, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The commissioner's office in Zagreb said the situation in Maglaj was "catastrophic."

In the Croatian capital Zagreb UNPROFOR spokeswoman Shannon Boyd said Maglaj should be placed under U.N. protection because of the heavy shelling.

However, the Bosnian Serb military command denied in a communique Thursday that its troops had launched an offensive, blaming Moslem forces for starting fighting along the northern front between Teslic, Maglaj, Gradacac and Brcko.

The statement said 15 Serb soldiers had died in fighting over the past few days with 102 others wounded.

Meanwhile, 349 Macedonian citizens were evacuated Thursday from Sarajevo, in one of the rare opportunities for the mainly Moslem population of some 380,000 besieged by Serb guns to leave the Bosnian capital, a U.N. civil affairs officer said.

Slovenians were evacuated last November, and other groups, including Jews, have been allowed to leave.

The Macedonians were to be taken by bus to Sarajevo airport and from there in French armored cars to Lukavica, a Serb-held suburb to the southwest and from there by bus to Macedonia.

Four people were taken off buses, however, before they left Sarajevo when Bosnian police said their papers were not in order. The four, who included a woman with a child, returned to their homes, the UNPROFOR civil affairs officer Carlos Gutierrez said.

Sarajevo was shelled Wednesday. Frewer said that in the 24 hours up to 1400 GMT Wednesday 46 mortar shells fell on Serb-held areas while the Serbs fired 24 mortars, 102 artillery, two tanks shells and 30 anti-aircraft artillery rounds. This is an increase over the relative calm of the past few days.

Serb, Croat and Moslem military leaders are to meet at Sarajevo airport Friday in a bid to demilitarize the Bosnian capital, Frewer said.

In Mostar, in the south, where there has been fierce fighting between Moslems and Croats, a prisoner exchange failed to take place Wednesday and was scheduled for Thursday, Frewer said.

In Srebrenica in the east there was small arms and machine gun fire at front-line positions between the defending Moslems and besieging Serbs.

Frewer said refugees who have crowded by the tens of thousands into Srebrenica forces were standing in line for up to two hours to get water.

He said the Serbs had denied U.N. engineering teams access to fix a filtration plant.

Muslim-Croat Clashes Continue in Mostar

LD2805041393 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2318 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Belgrade, May 27 (TANJUG)—The command of the 4th Corps of the Moslem Army of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina confirmed on Thursday evening that fighting had flared up again in Mostar, and accused the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) of using in their latest attacks mortars, hand-held rocket launchers, sniper rifles and infantry weapons, Moslem-controlled Radio Sarajevo has reported.

Croatian radio also reported fighting in Mostar.

Radio Sarajevo claimed that the military authorities of Bosnia- Herzegovina had released all HVO soldiers captured by Moslems in Mostar, while the HVO had set free just 56 Moslem soldiers.

The command also said that the fates of another 800 Moslem soldiers were unknown.

About 700 civilians crossed over the river Neretva (in both directions) on Wednesday—this was also confirmed by Croatian radio.

Croatian radio also quoted HVO sources as saying that Moslem Armed Forces had on Thursday begun to expel Croats from communities near Mostar.

The source said old and incapacitated persons were being forced out of their homes and younger people taken into custody.

Croatian radio also quoted HVO Commander Milivoj Petkovic as rejecting on Thursday allegations by Bosnia-Herzegovina Ambassador to the U.N. Muhamed Sacirbegovic that the HVO was preparing an offensive against the Moslems in the central part of the republic.

Muslim Attempt To Cross Demarcation Line

LD2805132993 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1205 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] An attempt was made last night by the Muslim forces in Mostar to break through the demarcation line. The hardest hit were the local medical facility and the building of the former Celovina prison. Reports from the area also say that the overnight attacks on the city were especially brutal with some 100 shells hitting the area, some of them landing on the city itself.

HVO Targets Residential Areas

AU2805120093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] According to [word indistinct] from Mostar and Prozor, we have learned that the forces of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] are continuing to provoke conflicts with members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, although less intensely.

Instead of the longed-for peace, last night in Mostar was marked by the sound of [word indistinct] weapons along the demarcation line of the army formations of the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army on the left bank of the Neretva River. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Fourth Corps command today issued a statement saying that the HVO Headquarters on the demarcation lines [words indistinct] of the conflict.

This morning, several mortar shells were fired at the left bank of the Neretva River from the HVO's positions. [Word indistinct] instead of military targets, the projectiles randomly targeted densely populated residential districts, thus causing new damage to the already seriously damaged city. There is no information about possible civilian casualties.

The 4th Corps command [word indistinct] the local and international public that the HVO is placing weapons of the largest caliber around the city. Their [word indistinct] are situated in [names indistinct] and in other places. This only shows that the HVO troops are not much interested in peace and the obligations stipulated by the Vance-Owen plan. The 4th Corps command has undertaken protective measures for the areas it controls, and it will fully respect the obligations taken on before the international subjects.

At 1000 [0800 GMT] today, talks between the military commissions of the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army were resumed. It is expected that, in accordance with the time schedule and priorities, the exchange of all captured civilians and soldiers will be resumed. A special commission has gone to tour the field.

New Attack on Doboj

AU2705143493

[Editorial Report] Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1300 GMT on 27 May 93 carries, in its regular 38-minute newscast, reports on the fighting in the republic.

Studio announcer reads report saying that "in the early afternoon hours, the Muslim forces launched a new artillery attack on the Doboj defense lines from the direction of Tesanj. The Muslim are using mortar and tank projectiles on the city itself, so that sirens sounded a general alert at 1320 [1120 GMT], and the population is currently in shelters."

Studio announcer says that "this morning in Mostar, the members of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and those of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] fiercely clashed once again. Fierce fighting in the streets is currently in progress in parts of the city on the right bank of the Neretva River. Serbian fighters who hold positions in the hills around Mostar have informed us that several apartment and other buildings are on fire in the city. Thick clouds of smoke rise from the Fourth Boulevard district."

Croatian Village Vrce Surrenders to Muslims

LD2805094393 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] The Croatian village of Vrce has been in the hands of the Muslim Army since last night. Members of the Croatian Defense Council had to surrender to the superior rival after two months of siege and heroic resistance. Although their military position became extremely difficult a long time ago, and despite the fact that thair children and women were subjected to blackmail—the Muslim Army was threatening that they would all be killed and the women raped—the defenders of Vrce delayed their surrender until they ran out of ammunition and food.

According to unconfirmed reports, members of the Croatian Defense Council and civilians from Vrce are now in Gornja Visnjevica.

Muslim Forces Launch Attack on Lukavica

LD2805111993 Pale Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Studio-S Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 May 93

[Excerpts] Alija Izetbegovic's followers launched a fierce artillery-infantry attack on Lukavica, more specifically on the (Trapara) settlement, from Mojmilo last night. On this occasion, three people were wounded and considerable material damage was inflicted. [passage omitted]

This morning was considerably more quiet. Muslim snipers are however not idle while conditions are ideal for them, and they have intensified fire on Zlatiste, the Jewish cemetery, Grbavica, Lukavica, Kula, and Nedjarici.

Muslims Attack Serb Positions in Zlatiste

LD2705221893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2108 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Pale, 27 May (TANJUG)—At about 2000, Muslim forces attacked Serb positions in Zlatiste in an attempt to cut off the important road between Pale and Lukavica.

The attack was repelled shortly before 2200, and no one was killed or injured among members of the Serb republic army.

However, one Croatian civilian was killed in the attack. He was transporting humanitarian aid to Sarajevo; his truck was hit as he was passing through Zlatiste.

The clips carried by Serb republic TV shortly after the attack showed one house and part of a forest on fire.

Serb fighters said that Muslim forces opened fire on them with mortars, antitank, and antiaircraft guns.

Serbs Shell Sarajevo; Several Wounded

AU2805072493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] The Chetniks began shelling Sarajevo in the early morning hours. At 0715 [0515 GMT] two Chetnik shells landed in the Centar commune, wounding several people seriously. The aggressor's projectiles are pounding [words indistinct] in Stari Grad. The enemy is using an M-84 machine gun [sijac smrti] against Sedrenik.

Last night after midnight, the Chetniks sporadically shelled parts of Novi Grad, notably Dobrinja. The morning is marked in Vogosca by occasional Chetnik small arms fire directed at the defense lines, while Novi Grad is deceptively quiet, with sporadic small arms fire.

UNPROFOR Evacuates 400 Macedonians From Sarajevo

LD2705162793 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] A group of about 400 Macedonians left Sarajevo today. Their evacuation was organized by the Macedonian Government and mediated by members of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR]. The UNPROFOR members ferried the group from Sarajevo airport to the Serbian barracks of Lukavica so they could travel to Skopje via Serbian territory.

The organizers of the convoy have told the public that all 400 persons have only temporarily left Sarajevo and that all of them will be able to return to the city once the war is over.

Convoy Stopped by Muslims

LD2705145693 Pale Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Studio-S Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Part of a convoy transporting around half of the 342 Macedonians who left Muslim Sarajevo at around 0900 this morning in the direction of Serbian controlled territory in Lukavica has still not been allowed passage at the Muslim checkpoint at Stup, the SRNA news agency's correspondent in Lukavica reports, citing a Macedonian Red Cross official. The reason for halting the buses transporting Macedonian citizens from Sarajevo is still not known, nor is it known when this part of the convoy will arrive in Lukavica.

Serb Army Questions UNPROFOR Neutrality

LD2705165693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1240 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Belgrade, 27 May (TANJUG)—The General Staff of the army of the Serb republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] today lodged a protest with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commands for former Yugoslavia and for former Bosnia-Herzegovina against Muslim forces' cease-fire violations in northern Bosnia and against, as the protest note says, the fact that Muslim helicopters are allowed to be deployed in combat flights. The protest note recalls that the Muslim forces are continuing combat operations in northern Bosnia and, with media help, are blaming Serbs for this. The UNPROFOR command is allowing them to fly helicopters that are bringing reinforcements in manpower and ammunition. This brings into question neutrality of the peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the protest note says, NATO pilots, instead of preventing such flights, are making direct radio links with helicopter pilots, while crews aboard AWACs planes are giving very precise information about these operations, including information that soldiers unloading ammunition are wearing green caps.

The General Staff of the army of the Serb republic calls on the UNPROFOR commands to do something and prevent the process of legalization of the deployment of the Muslim aviation, the protest note concludes.

Alleges Muslims Allowed To Use Helicopters

LD2705184593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1659 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Belgrade, May 27 (TANJUG)—The General Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina (VRS) on Thursday protested to the U.N. Protection Force

(UNPROFOR) commands for the former Yugoslavia and for Bosnia-Herzegovina because it said Moslem forces were violating the ceasefire in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina and Moslem helicopters were permitted to fly combat missions.

Moslem forces continue conducting military operations in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina and use media propaganda to shift the blame to the Serbian side, the protest said.

The ceasefire agreement signed by Bosnian Serbs and Moslems, through the mediation of UNPROFOR, took effect on May 9.

Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic, who is dissatisfied with the plan of action for Bosnia adopted in Washington on Saturday by the U.S., Britain, France, Russia and Spain, on Sunday urged Bosnian Moslems to continue fighting with all available means.

The VRS General Staff said in the protest, "fresh troops and ammunition are flown (to Moslems) by helicopters. The flights are approved by the UNPROFOR Command, which places in question the neutrality of the peace-keeping forces."

"Instead of preventing such flights, the pilots of NATO aircraft are making direct radio contact with the pilots of the helicopters, while AWACS crews are providing very detailed information about the operations, including that the soldiers who unload the ammunition from helicopters wear green berets" which are a feature of the Moslem troops.

The VRS general staff urged the UNPROFOR commands to do something to prevent the legalization of the use of the Moslem aviation.

The U.N. Security Council in October 1992 introduced a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The no-fly zone has been enforced by NATO aircraft since April 1993.

Water Shortage in Srebrenica May Force Evacuation

LD2805124893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1026 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] Belgrade, May 28 (TANJUG)—The situation in the Moslem enclave of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia is relatively calm, but the town has serious problems with the water supply, TANJUG learned at the headquarters of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Belgrade on Thursday evening.

The local Moslem authorities fear an epidemic because of the water shortage, so they are considering evacuating the refugees from the town, the UNPROFOR said.

Bosnian Serb corps commander in eastern Bosnia Milan Zivkovic on Wednesday evening told the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA that the Moslem forces had attacked Serb positions near Srebrenica and damaged the waterworks in the shelling.

The latest in a series of additionally agreed deadlines for the demilitarization of the region of Srebrenica expired on Thursday. The Moslem side has been postponing this demilitarization for over a month now, TANJUG learned at the Bosnian Serb army headquarters.

The UNPROFOR did not say if the Moslems had surrendered their weapons this time.

The source said that a British armored transporter hit a mine in the valley of the Lasva in central Bosnia on Wednesday. The same day, a French armored vehicle was damaged in a mine explosion near Cerkelovac. No one was injured in these incidents, the UNPROFOR said.

NATO Records at Least Nine Violations of No-Fly Zone

AU2805075093 Paris AFP in English 2359 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] Rome, May 28 (AFP)—NATO aircraft have reported nine "certified" violations of Bosnian airspace and 22 "probable" violations since the April 12 start of the U.N.-backed Deny Flight operation, a spokesman for the operational command in northern Italy said Thursday.

On Tuesday and Wednesday, four "radar traces" were spotted and identified as helicopters violating the ban on military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina, the spokesman reported.

Two of the cases were detected on Tuesday by U.S. F-15 fighters over Brcko in eastern Bosnia and by Turkish F-16 fighters over Tuzla. The NATO aircraft homed in on the area where the traces had been spotted and each time were able to "visually identify" a helicopter flying at low speed and which landed rapidly.

Similar violations were noted on Wednesday in central Bosnia by U.S. F-15s about 30 nautical miles from Sarajevo and by British Tornado aircraft in the region of Zenica. In the first case, the helicopter escaped visual contact but in the second the helicopter landed soon after being spotted.

When pilots did not manage to make "visual contact" with suspect "radar traces" the incidents were classified as "probable violations," the spokesman at the northern Italian base of Vicence explained.

Foreign Minister Reassigned; Granic Appointed

LD2805122393 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman decided today to relieve Minister of Foreign Affairs Zdenko Skrabalo of his post so he could take on the post of ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to Switzerland. Mate Granic, who will also perform the duty of vice president of the Croatian Government for international relations and foreign policies, has been appointed minister of foreign affairs. This decision is effective 1 June, the President's Office has announced.

Tudjman's Stance Toward Bosnian Croats Assessed

AU2805084293 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 May 93 p 10

[Commentary by Jelena Lovric: "Has Tudjman Given Up on Herceg-Bosna?"]

[Text] Although unannounced, the expected sanctions seem to have already begun to squeeze Croatia. Intended loans have been frozen. After one of its meetings, the government revealed that Croatian veal will no longer be able to enter the European Community. More and more countries are introducing visas for citizens of Croatia.

These are obviously attempts to discipline Croatia, primarily because of the leadership's attitude toward a neighboring state. The Croatian president has applied Pontius Pilate tactics in Herzegovina. He even threatened that this would be the last time that he tried to reconcile the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats and Muslims, as if he has nothing to do with their lethal quarrels. Tudjman has thus in some way tried to wash his hands of Herceg-Bosna and of what has happened there recently. According to a report by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, what has happened is that Croats in Bosnia have allegedly killed several hundred Muslims. According to German Ambassador Horst Wiesel, as reported by NEDELJNA DALMACIJA, the massacre was supposedly carried out under direct orders.

In his speeches on Herzegovina, Tudjman described this as provocation and ignorance of which one should be wary. For a man who knows how to make use of strong language, his language was not strong at all or effective. The Croats in Herzegovina have been acting under Ustasha, fascist symbols and the world knows this much better than Croatia.

In any case, if what was agreed upon in Medjugorje is put into practice, then this would mean the scrapping of the artificial para-state of Herceg-Bosna. This really was a state within a state with its own taxes and currency, intolerance toward the symbols of the legal state, and the establishment of the symbols of another state. This way of arranging matters and setting up a Herzegovinian, Croatian state distanced the Muslims from the Croats and the destructive factor of distrust was built into their relations. It was only a question of time before it exploded.

What has happened in the last few days in this area can briefly be summed up thus—Croatia against the Croats, or rather the Herceg-Bosnian Croats, but also Herceg-Bosnian Croats against Croatia. Even the Archbishop of Zagreb, Franjo Kuharic, rapped the Herzegovinians over the knuckles in an appeal for peace, telling them that their behavior cannot be allowed to undermine the Croatian state. Instead of everything that they were promised, the Croatian people in Herzegovina were given a rally. A pompous speech was delivered from a balcony with all the characteristics of a rally—up with the leaders, down with the turbulent sea of human heads. Even though he himself was on the balcony, it seems that [Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatian leader] Mate Boban is today as isolated as Radovan Karadzic. Unlike the people, who with Tudjman's tour at least got a sensation, Boban knows the score: The person who gave him everything with his support could now take it away if he no longer needed him.

The question is, however, whether Tudjman really has given up the idea of uniting with the rocky terrain of Hercegovina or is only trying to persuade the world that there is no reason to punish him. The question is also whether Milosevic has given up on Bosnia because, as Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky said recently, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Croatian and Serbian presidents want to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between themselves. Vranitzky criticizes both of them for not publicly saying this, because then the international community would be able to orientate itself more easily, which is of course the last thing that they [Tudjman and Milosevic] want.

In the last few days, there have been increasingly frequent assertions—albeit accidental—that the end of Bosnia should be recognized. Apart from the influential Kissinger, Alois Mock, Austrian foreign minister, also spoke about this this week. For him, the prospects for peace there are thin and the final collapse of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the most probable event. Furthermore, Mock says they will not be able to prevent the disappearance of Bosnia- Herzegovina.

Such a policy, the policy of dividing up Bosnia-Herzegovina, has never had the support of the Croatian public, but, apart from sporadic opinion polls, this has not been expressed anywhere else. Just as all domestic policy is determined by one man, so the same man also formulates foreign policy. Many people knew and many warned that the policy of the Croatian leadership on the neighboring state was something akin to Russian roulette, but their voices were not heard. It is, therefore, unjust now to blame only the Hercegovinians. They did not choose Boban, it could even be said that they did not entirely choose the policy that is being conducted on their behalf, and they could become the biggest losers.

Reports from Medjugorje and Siroki Brijeg show that Tudjman had talks with the brothers there and that these talks were by no means courtesy talks. Within a short period of time, Archbishop of Zagreb Franjo Kuharic has also clearly distanced himself from Croatian policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina. He first called the warring sides to make peace and, while Tudjman was in Herzegovina, he received Alija Izetbegovic in Zagreb, who had come to express his gratitude and respect.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina president said in this regard that "the church supports the independence, sovereignty, and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is gives us great hope that we will overcome the problems." Kuharic also asked Izetbegovic as head of state to solve the problems, and stressed his presidential office.

Threatened by the international community, if Franjo Tudjman really has thrown in the towel and given up his not entirely secret agenda for the neighboring state, then he will definitely need the help of the church, not only in calming down the dissatisfaction, but also in calming down that kind of destructive nationalism that, to judge by Mazowiecki's report, has spread dangerously and not only in Herzegovina.

Bosnian Government Accuses Croatia

AU2705113293 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 19 May 93 p 6

["Text" of the conclusions adopted by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its session on 13 May 1993: "Inconsistency of Croatian Policy"]

[Text] Zagreb—HINA received through the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia the communication signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina Mr. Hadzo Efendic in which it is stated, "The Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed the situation in Mostar and central Bosnia in its session on 13 May 1993. It also discussed the information received from the Croatian Defense and National Security Council and from the Croatian government regarding the conflicts between the Croatian Defense Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Herzegovina and central Bosnia."

The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina came to the following conclusions:

1. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina values highly the fact that the Republic of Croatia was one of the first countries to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it rejected the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro against Bosnia-Herzegovina and accepted a large number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina wishes to develop friendly relations with Croatia in all fields of interest for both countries.

3. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has accepted the Vance-Owen peace plan and is ready to implement it either completely or partially, that is to say to the extent that this is possible at the moment.

Taking these facts into consideration, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina regrets to establish that the policy of the Croatian Government has been inconsistent for a relatively long period of time now; in other words, differences exist between the declarations and the practice, the proclamations and behavior.

In stating this, we have the following things in mind:

1. The Croatian Government has openly supported the illegal actions of some Croatian Defense Council units in the latest conflicts in Mostar and central Bosnia. What makes the situation worse is the fact that the aforementioned units not only attacked the legal units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also carried out ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in Prozor, central Bosnia and recently in Mostar. The Croatian Government must also be acquainted with the fact—since the whole world knows it already—that the Croatian Defense Council units committed crimes against the inhabitants of the village of Ahmici near Vitez. These facts can neither be ignored nor hushed up because they have been confirmed by UN and EC Protection Force members, who are neutral. The Croatian Government has also received warnings from the UN Security Council, the European Community, the countries of the Islamic Conference and from the official representatives of Germany and Russia.

2. We have proof that the aforementioned actions by the Croatian Defense Council are supported by the Croatian Army. According to reliable information, the following units of the regular Croatian Army are situated on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina: 113th Split Brigade and certain parts of the Metkovic Brigade (in the regions of Buna, Dubrava and Stolac), 114th Split and 123d Varazdin Brigades (in the region of Lasva) and one tank unit in the region of Cvrsnica. We do not consider it necessary to point out that the presence of these units represents interference in the internal affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and contradicts the regulations of international law and formal statements made by the Croatian Government that it would respect the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apart from that, the presence of these units represents Croatia's direct military intervention in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. One of the inconsistent and incorrect elements of the Croatian policy against Bosnia-Herzegovina is also various statements made by some of Croatia's responsible leaders about a "division of Bosnia-Herzegovina," its "confederalization" and so on, which not only contradict the official recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, but also implies genocide because of the national structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since its inhabitants are mixed, it is obvious that before any kind of division

(or confederation) is made in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bloody task of ethnic cleansing must be performed.

Those who have performed ethnic cleansing in central Bosnia and Mostar have certainly found the support and motivation for their actions in such statements.

4. Apart from that, everybody knows that the Croatian mass media have been waging an open media war against Bosnia-Herzegovina and its leadership for a long time already. This media war is accompanied by misinformation, a blockade of information and presentation of only "their" truths. The Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is called the "Muslim Army," and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the "Muslim government." In order to have proofs for this last statement, it was required of the Croatian ministers (those who could be influenced) in the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to undermine the work of the government, or to stay outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.

It is certain that all presented circumstances harm Bosnia-Herzegovina and make its position in this unequal war against Serbian aggression more difficult. We are also sure that in the long run they will harm the Republic of Croatia and its people.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would like to point out once again that it wants to develop good relations and cooperation with the Republic of Croatia based on mutual respect and confidence, but if the attacks of the Croatian units in Bosnia-Herzegovina continue, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be forced to require help from the international community in order to defend its sovereignty and integrity.

Since the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is convinced that we can solve our problems only by negotiating, it is supporting the initiative to organize a meeting of the highest representatives of both states in the presence of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace conference cochairmen. Our delegation would attend this meeting with sincere intentions and with the wish to overcome the difficulties in our relations because this would be for the well-being of our nations.

Susak Responds to Accusations

AU2705113693 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 19 May 1993 p 6

[Reply of the Croatian Defense Ministry to the conclusions of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "False and Unfounded Accusations"]

[Text] Zagreb—In connection with the conclusions adopted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 13 May 1993 the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Croatia sent a letter to the Ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia, Mrs. Bisera Turkovic. This is the integral text of the letter:

We would like to kindly ask you to advance this letter in connection with "the conclusions adopted by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 13 May 1993" to your government. The Croatian Government was pleased to realize that the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina appreciated the fact that the Republic of Croatia was one of the first countries to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it flatly rejected the Serbian and Montenegrin aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and accepted a large number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Republic of Croatia is also pleased to accept the determination of Bosnia-Herzegovina to develop friendly relations with the Republic of Croatia.

We also agree with the decision of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan either completely or partially, according to the agreement between Izetbegovic and Boban signed on 25 April 1993.

The Republic of Croatia has tried and it will try to contribute to a peaceful solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, it will especially try to bring the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an end. That is why we supported the Vance-Owen plan, which should secure an equal position for all three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is a prerequisite to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In connection with your conclusions adopted in the session of your government on 13 May 1993, in which you stated a series of incorrect facts trying to present also Croatia as an aggressor against Bosnia-Herzegovina, we would like to point out the following facts:

1. Your allegations in point 1 that "the Government of the Republic of Croatia supported illegal actions of some Croatian Defense Council units in the latest conflicts in Mostar and central Bosnia" are not true. We would like to stress that we are acquainted with the crimes committed in the village of Ahmici near Vitez. These facts were also confirmed by the representatives of the Croatian Defense Council, which means that we did not want to hush up these crimes. The Republic of Croatia wants all the facts to be revealed with the help of an international commission and the culprits to be punished. Some things have certainly been hushed up, but on your side, as was for example the case with the recent crimes in Croatian villages near Konjic as well as with several thousands of Croats being held captive in the vicinity of Zenica.

2. The following statement of yours is not true: "According to reliable data the following units of the regular Croatian Army are situated in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 113th Split Brigade and certain parts of the Metkovic Brigade (in the region of Buna, Dubrava and Stolac), 114th Split and 123d Varazdin Brigades (in the region of Livno) and one tank unit (in the region of Cvrsnica),

because these and other Croatian Army units are situated on the territory of the Republic of Croatia." The international organizations (United Nations and EC) can easily prove that these accusations are unfounded. We would like to invite them to conduct an investigation in the regions you mentioned. The Republic of Croatia will fully help them to perform this task.

In order to be precise, we would like to say that a very small number of units of the Croatian Army is situated in the border zone between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the region of Dubrovnik. These units are situated there according to the principles of international law and by consent of international organizations in order to protect the town of Dubrovnik and its surroundings from possible attacks from our joint enemy, the Serbian aggressor. We are ready to withdraw our units from this area to Croatia as soon as peace is established.

In connection with point 3 we have to warn you that none of the official representatives of the Republic of Croatia spoke about the "confederalization" of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the aim of splitting it, but only about its division into provinces according to the Vance-Owen peace plan, which should secure an equal position for all three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in this way preserve the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslim leadership has been supporting the option of a unitary state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has not been accepted by all Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is used as a pretext for placing Croatia on the same level as Serbia and Montenegro. What is more, this could create the impression in the international community that there is a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would force international organizations to make decisions supporting your ideas about a unitary Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. The Republic of Croatia is not conducting a media war, but its press and other mass media, which are not controlled by the state, transmit information they receive from various sources because it is considered that they reflect various viewpoints and give exact descriptions of events. As an example of propaganda, I would like to mention yesterday's information given by the Press Center of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the truce initiated by General Morillon, signed between General Petkovic and General Mladic, is presented as a proof of cooperation between the Chetniks and the Croatian Defense Council. It is forgotten at the same time that such a truce, also initiated by General Morillon, was signed between General Mladic and General Halilovic several days ago.

We sincerely hope that you will stop making such incorrect accusations against Croatia because they distract attention from the war in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, that is to say from the Serbian aggression. Only the final defeat of the Serbian aggressor can make peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as well as in the whole area of the former Yugoslavia possible.

The letter was signed by the Defense Minister of Croatia, Mr. Gojko Susak.

Division in Army Discussed

93BA1029A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 93 pp 24-26

[Article by Edvard Popovic: "Fighters Lose Paper Battle"]

[Text] Upon his release from the Serb camp, the commander of Borovo Naselje said that his interrogators were unable to comprehend one quite ordinary thing, that the Croatian Armed Forces [HV] did not consistently apply the tactics formulated in the textbooks and manuals of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. It had to do with this: When asked about the second and third lines of Vukovar defenders, the commander of Borovo Naselje responded that those lines did not even exist. Not believing him, they beat him, because the Serb armada was expending tens of thousands of shells against positions that, according to the textbooks, should have been the second and third lines of defense. The idea is rather simple: As many enemy fighters as possible should be killed and incapacitated before they are deployed in battle.

Croatian Purple Heart

This story is only an illustration of two different ways of understanding combat skills. On the one side are eager beavers completely devoted to theory and ingrained knowledge, according to which the Serb armed forces in Slavonia, with the equipment available to it, should advance as much as 30 km a day. Today, the price paid by that army to bridge the chasm between theory and practice is widely known. On the other side there are the thinking soldiers, improvisers who, when approached by a tank, do not act as if they were not seeing it, regardless of what the manual says. "In Vukovar," says Brig. Branko Borkovic, the commander of that city's defense, "the Serbs fought according to the textbook, while we really could not afford that luxury. There, the long-standing view of the [word illegible] soldier, stupid and obedient, was definitively buried. For 10 years now, the Americans have been formulating in theory what we experienced there in practice. This is the return of individualism to the military. A soldier must be intelligent, must think things out, because he is deciding about his own life. And precisely for that reason it is necessary that he have absolute freedom of action within his sphere of activity. The goal is to carry out the mission and stay alive, not to execute it at any price, regardless of casualties." The appropriateness of this view of combat skill has been confirmed on Croatian battlefields, especially in Vukovar, Sunja, or on the southern front, where groups of five Croatian soldiers, despite all the textbooks, have routed much more numerous garrisons of enemy fortifications.

Today, however, it is worrisome that according to some signs the clash between these two views has shifted to a place where there is the least room for it, the Croatian Armed Forces. "The problem is the negative selection of personnel," says one colonel in the HV, "which means that through private connections careerists have gotten certain positions and are surrounding themselves with friends, not experts, hated officers from the former JNA.... I admit that even I do not like the latter, especially not those who joined later, but Croatia needs them. We need their know-how right now. Another problem is the inflation of ranks. Ranks have set people at variance. Those who entered this war with their hearts and gave something are now watching as others around them grab hold of positions, housing.... While they remain in the same place. The Americans have the Purple Heart for wounded soldiers. One medal for each wound. Similarly for each military campaign, a soldier can be given a star, and there are also medals for courage, commendations. But here, ranks are handed out instead of medals. Hence the disagreements. I am a colonel, I commanded a separate battalion, I led a sector in combat activities, and I have been in the war from day one. And today I am ashamed to hold that rank when I see who all holds it."

Fever at the Top

An HV sergeant who signed a contract with the Guard in late July 1991 and who has fought on the battlefields (eastern and western Slavonia and then on the southern front) was told laconically at the Main Staff when he went to resolve some status problems that he had joined the HV too early. "It is utterly ridiculous," he says. "Even the bus driver who drove boys to the campaign in Plitvice has officer's rank today. I would not be surprised if even cleaning women had officer's ranks. Does that bother me? And why would it bother me? I am a sergeant, and earned my rank by shedding blood. Those with higher ranks should be ashamed." Four soldiers were ordered to join the newly formed guard brigade in order to take over command duties. But nothing came of that job, because the brigade commander offered them jobs as bodyguards, based on their extensive war experience, which they flatly turned out. "I understand why the president of the republic has bodyguards. But I have never heard of a brigadier in an army having them. From whom are we supposed to protect him?" Their quest for rank has been going on for six months. The head of the Personnel Administration, who signed the order, has in the meantime moved on to a new post, and right now things are at a deadlock. The deputy commander of one battalion says that for the most part it is the most experienced fighters who are leaving his unit. "I tried to talk to them, to persuade them to stay because things have to change, because this tumult cannot go on forever, but then it occurred to me that even I will not extend my contract, which is due to expire shortly, so I gave up talking about it."

The same fever is shaking the very top echelons of the HV. It remains unclear why Croatia so casually repudiated the services of Brig. Branko Borkovic and Col. Ivan Grbavac Cobra. The two of them are a good example of how reconciliation between the two factions of officers in the HV is possible, those who are deserters from the former JNA and those who became officers in the homeland war. At the same time, their "cases" bear witness to how the tensions in the HV are not a consequence of the conflict between JNA deserters and authentic Croatian fighters, rather, this conflict is between two mental complexes, the two views described at the beginning of this article.

Capt. Borkovic deserted the JNA in July 1991. A month of authentication and then, in late August, Vukovar. Chief of staff until mid-October, when Dedakovic went to Vinkovci, while Borkovic took over command of the city's defense. On 17 November, he effected a breach. Under an edict from President Tudjman, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier. On 3 March 1993, at his own request, his contract with the HV was terminated. "There are people who have Vukovar on their conscience and who want to liberate it," he says. "It appears that that circle of people in the Main Staff, those late arrivals from the JNA, that 'class of October 1991' or 'class of March 1992,' deplore the JNA defeats and want to alleviate them in any way possible. Because if they appreciate us and accept us, who achieved dazzling results even without their participation, how then can they talk about their own indispensability and irreplaceability?" Identifying in this way one pole of tension, Borkovic is only partially right. It appears that he is very close to the truth when he talks about people who shrink from deserving fighters. "Those who have no service in the homeland war shrink from them. Because compared to them, they are no one and nothing. Nor could they hold the positions that they have today, and it is self-evident that they did not achieve those positions because of the results of their labors or their contribution to the Croatian struggle."

Croatian Officers School

Ivan Grbavac, who holds an engineering degree in agronomy, is a typical product of Croatian officers school. His first encounter with the multiparty concept came in 1986, when he was given a prison sentence for those ideas. He joined the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in 1990 as one of the party's founders in Virovitica. Later he occupied the post of vice chairman of the Virovitica branch of the party, followed by vice president of the opstina. In mid-March 1991, he became commander of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] special Rakitje company. In mid-May of the same year, with the formation of the ZNG [National Guard Corps], he commanded the 1st Battalion of 1A Brigade of the ZNG. In late August 1991, that unit was transformed into the Defense Battalion of the ZNG Command, which was the first formation of the Military Police in Croatia. Grbavac remained the commander even after it changed its name in early October to the Defense Battalion of the

HV Main Staff. In mid-November 1991, the unit officially became the 66th Battalion of the Military Police. Grbavac's own military nickname, Cobra, was embroidered on its emblem. Grbavac commanded the unit that captured the JNA's Precec warehouse in the fall of 1991, and also participated in the capture of the barracks in Varazdin and Bjelovar. He fought on the Gospic, Ilok, and southern fronts. In late May 1992, he was promoted to the rank of colonel, while at the beginning of this year he was placed "on a six-month disposal," which means in practice his definitive departure from the HV. Col. Grbavac refused to respond to suggestions that his departure from the HV was hurried along by certain details in his biography. For example, the fact that he was born in Klobuk, that he is related to Andrija Artukovic and Ludvig Pavlevic, that he was too close to Spegelj and too fond of the HSP [Croatian Rights Party]. "I am still an HV officer, and the time to talk will come."

Even generals are not exempt. Everyone knows what happened to Gen. Spegelj. Gen. Josip Lucic, an authentic Croatian general, is still in the game, but his move from the post of head of the Personnel Administration to that of chief inspector of the HV cannot be interpreted as a promotion. Judging from Gen. Spegelj's case, the chief inspectorate of the HV is a door that leads out of the Ministry of Defense [MO]. Reports have leaked from the MO that the clashes within the ruling party could be reflected in that ministry as well. Specifically, according to a source close to the military top brass, the issue at stake is the possible successor to Corps Gen. Janko Bobetko. The "right" wing of the HDZ has several favorites for now, but not one of them meets all the conditions for such a demanding post. The "left" wing has one general, a deserter from the JNA. According to some sources in the military top brass, however, the problem is that before the first free elections the general in question made an offer to Racan in which he said that he would resolve that matter by force, and that when he later went over to the HV the results of his work were anything but riveting.

Debunked Myth

It is not our intention to split hairs. The Croatian Armed Forces, in a conflict where from the outset world public opinion felt that they stood no chance whatsoever, beat the snout of a highly ranked armada, nicely reaffirming the Biblical story of David and Goliath. And it is precisely because of all the inspired battles and victories by the HV that no one, but no one, has the right to push into mediocrity those who have been beaten up. The tensions that we are discussing here are still, fortunately, more the exception than the rule. In part they can be attributed to MO officials who have not yet resolved administrative tasks, such as the criteria for the awarding of ranks and medals. Because such criteria do not exist, it is possible for one officer to be thrown out of the effective structure of the HV while another is promoted to a higher post, both based on the same thing, a poorly executed campaign. We know of one case of a company commander wounded in battle who was demoted to the post of ordinary soldier after returning from treatment. Once again a lack of solid criteria. It is illusory to expect that a structure like the military can achieve perfection over night, especially if it is created during wartime. However, one can rightly expect that good foundations will be laid. The Croatian Armed Forces has good models from the past, and we are thinking here primarily of the Home Guard during the Second World War, and the positive experience in this war. For fifty years, Belgrade has suggested to our nation that it is cowardly and that it needs protectors, Serbs of course. Over the past two years, the "cowards" have definitively debunked the myth of the Serb warrior. Croatia does not need myths today, least of all one of that nature. Instead, it will be an adequately strong, well-organized armed force.

[Box, p 25]

Branko Borkovic, Reserve HV Brigadier: "HV Is Becoming HNA [Croatian People's Army]"

[DANAS] Why did you actually terminate your contract with the Croatian Armed Forces?

[Borkovic] In my request, I cited personal reasons, which is a rather broad term. The main reason was that the 204th Brigade, which fought in Vukovar, was not officially recognized. Its members were not given a corresponding place in the HV and in Croatian society in general. I wrote a memo about this which I submitted to the chief of the Main Staff before leaving, but after my final decision to leave. There is also the attitude toward me. In May 1992, I was ordered to transfer to a post with the HV Main Staff. As a brigadier, they "generously" gave me the post of captain. But the problem was not so much the fact that my authorities were such that in the office I could not move a chair from one place to another on my own. And at age 32, I have no intention of rotting away in some bureaucratic apparatus, nor does that fit in with my attitude toward working and struggling for Croatia. My view of the HV is completely different from the one that is currently being generated. As things stand now, instead of the Croatian Armed Forces we will have the Croatian People's Army. We had our chance to be a modern army, given our significant war experience, perhaps even a stronger one than the Israeli army, but they are pushing us toward the mediocrity of the former JNA.

[DANAS] Who is doing that?

[Borkovic] I am thinking mostly of the people in the HV who are creating an armed force in accordance with their own wretched possibilities, and not in accordance with and on the level of the possibilities of those who have been in the HV since the first days. Look, the essence of the problem is this: It is not important where some Croat is from. A Croat is a Croat. What is important is what motives prompt people to join the HV. We all know quite well when the war in Croatia began and when the first organized units began to form. They had people from the JNA and a terribly large number of Croats

without any military know-how whatsoever, either people from the former SUP [Secretariat of Internal Affairs], the UDBA [State Security Administration], the diaspora, or wherever else. And all of them created the HV. Today, the problem is not these people, but rather the newly composed, newly created "young people," some of whom are 20 years older than I. A new generation is being created, either mothers' or fathers' sons or newcomers, late arrivals from the JNA. Permit me to question their sincerity, the purity of their reasons for joining the HV. You know, the last thing in the world I wanted was to seek glory in Vukovar. I went there for deep patriotic reasons. After deserting from the JNA, I could have simply gone to Germany and cleared my conscience by sending back several thousand marks. Remaining in the former JNA was absolutely out of the question. I am amazed by how many Croats who were in the former JNA were in high-ranking positions, and now they are respected in the HV; I am amazed by how long they were allowed to stay in that JNA. So you cannot talk today about how the JNA was weakened by their departure. The question is to what extent the HV and Croatia were strengthened by their arrival. Indeed, what were their motives in coming to the HV? What do they really want? In addition, while I was the chief of staff in Vukovar they were still in the JNA. Why did they not leave the JNA and go to Vukovar? Who could have stopped them? I would be happy and satisfied if someone else had been in my place and I had held my rank in Vukovar, and thus if I had been a company or battalion commander. In that case, I would be the happiest man in the world.

[DANAS] Gen. Daidza recently ceased to be an HV operative. He commented on his decision by saying that now he is a sick, armchair-based, former officer of the Yugoslav armed forces, and now HV officers are applauding that decision.

[Borkovic] Well, I experienced something similar. The minute I left they jumped for joy. Probably because their on-duty conscience was leaving, which they had to face every day. Because these armchair, operetta-style officers also came up with that infamous assessment, on the basis of which they refused to break through toward Vukovar. They actually jumped for joy when I left.

[DANAS] Are you considering going abroad now?

[Borkovic] No Borkovic has ever lived outside Croatia, and I have no intention of doing so. I will not leave my Croatia, no matter what happens. I live here, I will stay here, and I will fight for it. No one can keep me from doing so.

[Box, p 26]

Deputy Minister of Defense Slobodan Praljak: Everyone Will Find His Place

[DANAS] Information about a conflict between two factions within the City Staff of the HV has been leaked to the public. On the one hand are members of the former JNA, and lined up against them is the officers corps created in the homeland war.

[Praljak] I would not call it that exactly. It is more like a conflict between two mental complexes, or rather ways of thinking. A mental complex does not change in the short term, a certain adjustment period is needed. Some officers from the former JNA do not know how to build a system different from the one in which they worked for years. And that is why they are carrying out restructuring today, they want to play the game that they know. On the other hand, from the outset they have been poorly received at the front, and later they were reproached for not being anywhere. Each of them will find his place in time. And the results of their work should be a measure of this.

[DANAS] Does that mean that you are tracking the development of soldiers, that there exists a defined selection process for personnel?

[Praljak] It exists, to the extent that it is possible in this situation. The outfitting of personnel is not yet complete, and we are not completely satisfied with some solutions, but I can say that this is a process that is still going on.

[DANAS] In the meantime, some people are leaving the HV who have been in the war from day one.

[Praljak] Unfortunately that is true. The problem is the impatience felt by those who are leaving and who have clearly served the Republic of Croatia, because things do not change as quickly and radically as they wanted, and that desire was their motive for participating in the fighting.

Opposition Urges Constitutional Changes

93BA1029B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 93 pp 22-23

[Article by Miljenko Manjkas: "End Justifies the Means"]

[Text] *Leaders of the ruling party believe that the demand to revoke the administration's authorities is simply a subtle way to open the final debate in the Assembly on changing the semi-presidential system into a parliamentary one. In this way, the opposition is attempting to become a relevant political factor.*

"Only God is above the Croatian Assembly." In making an argument for Croatia's unique status and continuity as a state, Croatian politicians have often uttered the above phrase. The existence of Croatian political identity has been expressed regardless of whether the crown was on the head of an Austrian, Hungarian, or Serbian monarch. But judging from the development of democracy witnessed over the past three years, there is well-justified fear that the statement could soon lose its positive connotation due to a lack of understanding of political events.

Since the creation of democratic Croatia, both the government and the opposition have succeeded in mutually resolving fundamental political questions. The establishment of a Government of National Unity during the most intense aggression, the united front toward the international community, and the electoral system are only some of the expressed or tacit agreements reached. However, the two sides have yet to come to terms over the question of the division of power and the party system. Only a few months after the adoption of the Constitution, criticism of the semi-presidential system began to be heard. The opposition began to raise the question of why the Constitution was even adopted unanimously, maintaining that in terms of the relationship between legislative and executive power a parliamentary system is more appropriate to Croatia than is the current semi-presidential system. The latter is criticized for the excessively broad authorities of the executive, especially of the president as its standard bearer, whereby a shift from the executive toward the parliament—or rather the legislative body—is sought.

The second significant open political question is linked to the party system. The dozens of marginal parties, especially those not represented in parliament, whose views are supported by the largest opposition party, the HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance], and several other parliamentary parties maintain that Croatia is better suited by a multiple-party system. This is in contrast to a multiparty system, which presupposes relevant political influence by three, four, or at most five political parties, which split up almost the entire electorate. Feeling that even the most marginal parties should be represented in parliament, the opposition thus advocates an electoral system without prohibitive clauses.

Although the debate on the two unresolved questions is part of nearly every Assembly session and the majority of party press conferences, the opposition has reopened this debate in recent days, and it appears to be more intense than ever.

Struggle for Power

SDP [Party of Democratic Changes] Assembly deputy Ivan Matija was the first to demand the repeal of the Law on the Authorities of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, which removes individual questions from the control of the Assembly. Specifically, each year the Assembly gives the administration the authority to handle current, especially economic business that cannot wait for Assembly sessions. Mr. Matija feels that these authorities should be revoked because of government abuses and the need to strengthen legal security, on which, he believes, these authorities have a negative influence.

Moreover, they continue, the Assembly grants the administration authorities for a term of one year with regard to the regulations in question, and that is precisely so that they can be reexamined. Admittedly, this provision is more of a formality, and there are practically no cases in developed Western democracies where the parliament has deprived the administration of one of the aforementioned regulations or refused to extend the term. This is in fact the reason for the decision by some countries, such as France, for example, to regulate this matter constitutionally, not by law. But regulated by law or by the constitution, all Western European democracies, even the most stable ones, use this mechanism for transferring legislative authority to the executive branch, due to the "excessive pace" of economic life. To this end, "decrees" and "ordinances" are enacted in France, "statutory instruments" in Great Britain, "regulations" in the United States, and "full powers" in Switzerland, and Germany and the extremely parliamentary and multiple-party Italy are no exception either. The existence of regulations does not belittle the Assembly, but rather contributes to efficiency. Finally, the Assembly debates laws that are much more important than those that deal with current economic policy. Thus, one wonders why there are demands that these authorities be revoked in Croatia, especially now, only six months after they were transferred to the administration.

Leaders of the ruling party believe that the demand to revoke the administration's authorities is simply a subtle way to open the final debate in the Assembly on changing the semi-presidential system into a parliamentary one. Only in this way can the opposition attempt to become a relevant political factor. No matter how weak, there are still certain opportunities for political struggle in the Assembly, given the fact that it has no influence whatsoever in the administration. Even if it cannot outvote the ruling party, the opposition in the Assembly can obstruct its work, HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] figures contend. Thus, the demand in question is simply a smoke screen for the struggle for power and party clashes.

Shadow Government

In contrast to this view, people better acquainted with party confrontation have determined the reasons why the demand to strip the administration of its authorities did not arise several months earlier or later. Specifically, they believe that the opposition is aware of the details of the current conflicts within the HDZ and is taking maximum advantage of them.

Its first goal is to provoke a complete split within the ruling party, and the second one is to resolve, at the same time, the aforementioned political questions in its favor. The opposition hopes that because of the split in the ruling party it will gain the support of part of the HDZ. According to some indications coming from the opposition, some of them have already publicly expressed their readiness to support the opposition in this. Reportedly, they are the very ones who through recent shifts in the ruling party have exchanged executive with legislative authority, i.e., the administration with the parliament, or have even shifted executive authority from some local

bodies to the legislature. Given the frequency of changes in the ruling party, the opposition expects significant support. Thus, the opposition's idea is to use the consequences of the recent "restructuring" of the ruling party to engender new conflict. But the question arises of how profound the consequences of this second conflict could be, or rather how big the opposition's appetite is, and what all it is capable of doing. Will the ultimate consequence be only a drop in the ruling party's esteem, or will it all end in some more significant political decision?

The fact that the dust is not being raised fortuitously is confirmed by the signers of SDP deputy Matija's demand, which include several of the most influential liberals, Sosic's verbal clash with Tomac, and the subsequent HSLS demand for a parliamentary system. All on the same day. But if there is consensus on the issue within the parliamentary opposition, ideas about the results that should be achieved certainly differ.

Given the results of the last elections, the Istrian Democratic Assembly would be satisfied with a change from a semipresidential system to a parliamentary one. It would be supported in this by all parliamentary opposition parties. However, such a change could come about only after a change in the Constitution, to which the ruling party would certainly not agree.

But if part of the HDZ supports the opposition, as it expects, and the parliament manages to strip the administration of its authority to issue regulations in the foreseeable future, Croatia will inevitable find itself in a political crisis, because the latest session showed clearly how sluggish the Assembly is and how much time it needs to adopt marginal laws. The crisis could be resolved only by holding early parliamentary elections, which some of the opposition parties have been mentioning frequently of late, and which is also their ultimate goal.

Thus, the demand to revoke the authority to issue regulations is a smoke screen for the intention to change the system of government (from a semipresidential to a parliamentary one), while the change in the system of government is a smoke screen for the intention to change the government itself. In pursuit of the latter aim, the liberals have already set up a shadow government, "in case it is needed," before which, of course, they withheld their confidence in the Valentic administration.

The intentions to change the semipresidential system, the Constitution, and the party system and to set up shadow governments are completely legitimate. At the same time, it is completely logical that the opposition is trying to take maximum advantage of the rumblings within the HDZ. However, two of the opposition parties have demonstrated in this political struggle a dose of political illiteracy and inconsistency. The demand by the SDP's Ivan Matija for change from the semipresidential to a parliamentary system is completely commonplace in Western democracies, but the attempt to achieve that by revoking the administration's regulations would lead us into a situation similar to communism. In that case, such regulations—under the pretext of the existence of a parliamentary system—would not be issued, but rather resolved through other mechanisms that would be harder to control. Of course, the reason is not the parliamentary system, because Switzerland, which also has a parliamentary system, uses regulations.

Political Confusion

Another example is the liberal shadow government. It is frivolous for a party that bases all of its political activities on maximum pluralism, which is also its basis for supporting a multiple-party system, to use an institution that is linked exclusively to a two-party system. The shadow government is an institution for not wasting time in setting up a new government if the ruling party falls, given the fact that there are only two relevant parties in a country. While the only rival party is in power, the shadow government puts forward, in parallel fashion, its own solutions to problems, continually competing with it and trying to take voters away from it.

However, no matter how much this is the liberals' intention, their shadow government is completely contrary to their principles. It appears that the fact that the liberals, by pretending to be English, have tried to imitate the British will be more of a hindrance than a help to their political esteem. Perhaps it is precisely because of a lack of arguments that Mr. Budisa refused to explain to us his support for a parliamentary system.

However, these are not the only two parties that have sunk into political confusion. It can be said quite frankly that the House of Zupanijas has at the very least functioned in a manner that is incompatible with the Constitution. It is not its duty to debate every point on the agenda, only laws that it considers important. Thus, we must conclude that our entire legislative branch is in a procedural crisis. Or perhaps the House of Zupanijas, thinking that only God is above the Assembly, considers all laws exceptionally important.

Citizens Polled on Peace, Relations With FRY

93BA1035D Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 15 May 93 p 16

[Article by Stojan Obradovic: "Coexistence Is Still Possible"]

[Text] *Polls among the Croatian population indicate that more and more people are thinking about a peaceful settlement of the disputes; more than half are prepared to accept a loose customs and economic union between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].*

The constant waiting for military intervention as the only solution for the bloody drama that will soon enter its third year (!) in the former Yugoslavia this summer with the anniversary of the military attack against Slovenia is increasingly similar to waiting for Godot. Perhaps more realistic are the views that the war will subside

and some sort of political solution, similar to the one in Lebanon, will be possible only after the warring sides are completely exhausted and when they want peace, because their will for war has passed. Only then will it be possible to have peace, which will yield neither an absolute winner nor an absolute loser, but will instead consolidate the belief that it is only in peace that something can be achieved, and not in war at all.

It would be hard to say whether anyone is seriously thinking about anything like this. From all indications, however, there is something resembling that view, at least in Croatia. That is also demonstrated by the latest public opinion polls, according to which people are thinking more and more about peace, future life in this region, coexistence with the Serbs, etc. Among the more interesting data are those which were collected from a representative sample among the residents of Zagreb, Osijek, and Zadar by the PULS research department of the Split newspaper firm SLOBODNA DALMACIJA.

The most important finding is that people are no longer prepared to wait too long for peace. The fact that three-fourths of those polled have lost their patience also demonstrates their attitude toward the authorities, regarding which almost half of those asked in another poll thought that it had done too little to defend the Dalmatian areas. That fact perhaps indicates the growing dissatisfaction and possible loss of patience among those who are not in favor of a peaceful end to the war, and negotiations with the Serbs. Two-thirds of those polled are in favor of having Croatia, in the present international and foreign policy situation, submit to that form of establishing Croatian authority throughout its territory. Otherwise, this was the first time that it was announced that the majority was in favor of negotiations and a peaceful settlement, not war. It is interesting that the residents of Zagreb are more enthusiastic about a military solution than those of Osijek and Zadar, who were also more tolerant and inclined toward agreements on other matters. Perhaps it is also because they are more aware of the casualties that have already occurred and that would also be incurred by a more radical settlement of relations. This is also supported by the increasingly more frequent statements by high state officials and important individuals in the ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Community, that in spite of everything it is nevertheless necessary to strive for a peaceful settlement of the disputes and that Croatian land has already been sufficiently inundated with blood, although they otherwise do not reject more decisive and more militant methods of establishing Croatian authority, but only if it cannot be done otherwise.

It is interesting that in spite of the horrors of war that have been occurring in this area for three years now, more than 70 percent of those polled are convinced that mass migrations of peoples to their parent ethnic areas would not be necessary to ensure peace on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It seems that in one way or another people are only prepared to live together. That was probably also influenced by the belief that those who had to leave or for whom Croatia was not their homeland have already left. The poll's result is similar to the data obtained by sociologist Milan Mesic with a survey among exiles and refugees, and published under the title "Sensitive and Angry People." If we take into account the fact that among the people most affected by the war, only a third are convinced that no coexistence of any kind is possible, then we also cannot question Mesic's finding that in spite of everything, Croatia has not lost the civilized value of tolerance, with respect to either cultural diversity or the existence of the Serbian community in Croatia. If we consider these data more or less reliable, then we must not be surprised that in a poll published by NEDELJNA DALMACIJA, half of those polled answered that they were even willing to accept a loose customs and economic union between Croatia and the FRY, if that would bring peace and guarantee Croatia's sovereignty over all its territory. After three years of bloodshed, that does sound blasphemous, but a majority of those polled obviously accepted that possibility, while subconsciously justifying themselves by telling themselves that it does not mean a new political community as well. Once again, among those who have suffered the most there were the most people who confirmed this, and that is probably also a consequence of the economic backwardness and collapse with which people in Croatia are wrestling, especially in Dalmatia. At the same time, everyone is aware that in any case it will not be possible to avoid economic cooperation completely. The international community also strongly supports something like that, and allegedly has even prepared some sort of plans for economic associations in this region.

None of the polls, of course, included a question about a possible political community, which is proof that it is still not time for anything like that, even though, in view of the devastation and casualties and the general mood, we could think about what the answers would be like. Such questions can only be posed where reliable answers can be expected; it seems as though the researchers were afraid of what average people thought, and as though they doubted their own ability to think and decide about it. Among the answers, we could quite certainly read something similar to the statement by Josip Manulic, president of the Croatian Chamber of Parishes, who said that it would only be possible to think about such a community after 50 or 100 years. It is interesting that in contrast to many people who do not even admit that possibility, he at least left the door partly open to possibly talking about it after a century or so, although he was probably thinking about a century of peace.

Data on Production of Weapons Detailed

93BA1008A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 93 pp 11-12

[Article by Ratko Boskovic: "The First Croatian Missiles on the Factory Conveyor!"]

[Text] Assembly-line industrial production of the weapons of war is still concealed from the public in Croatia. GLOBUS newsmen visited a large Croatian firm and talked to the superintendent of "special-purpose production," but they were not allowed to publish the names of either the factory or their informants. This attitude toward the public will change toward the end of this year, when the factory in question will exhibit in the autumn exhibition at the Zagreb Fairgrounds more than 40 products from the arsenal that even now it is producing in its entirety for the Croatian Army [HV]!

The newsmen still have not been allowed to publish the entire list of those 40 or so products. They include a sniper carbine, a small machine gun, rockets for the 128-mm multiple-barrel launcher (VBR), a recoilless cannon, a 130-mm cannon, optical sights, launchers for surface-to-air missiles [SAM] fired from the shoulder, fuzes for all types of mines and shells, a magnetic mine detector, and—the most sophisticated weapon—a self-propelled SAM system!

Small-Arms Ammunition Is the Only Thing We Are Not Producing Yet

The list is so long and so varied that the superintendent who gave it to the newsmen probably was not far wrong when he said that "Croatia is now in a situation where it need not import anything in the essential defensive arsenal any longer." From what we know, only small-arms ammunition is still not being series- or mass-produced in Croatia.

Before the war for the homeland, Croatia did not have even a recollection of a solid factory making the weapons of war, and therefore it also lacked the knowledge and technological experience to make them. The defense industry under sponsorship of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] consisted, both metaphorically and literally, of "stamping out" soldiers' mess tins at Koncar in Zagreb, where they were also manufacturing field kitchens and portable power generators. Even the manufacturing of tanks at Djuro Djakovica in Slavonski Brod consisted actually of putting together tank assemblies, not one of which in the combat package was manufactured on the soil of Croatia. Combat patrol boats were built and repaired in Croatian shipyards, but the weapons for them also came from other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Perhaps the most advanced technology in Croatia with possible application to war was developed in Licki Osik, where there was a factory making rockets to combat hail!

Only those parts of military equipment which Croatian scientists had acquired by virtue of their above-average knowledge were made in Croatia: Thus, the JNA purchased laser range finders for its tanks in Croatia, sonars for ships and submarines, and communications systems for the infantry, but as soon as any of that was developed to the point of high-technology assembly-line production, the development documentation, expensive machines, and indeed even experts would immediately be moved to Nis, Kragujevac, Uzice.... The justification given the public for such action was "strategic considerations," the need to withdraw the defense industry into the country's mountainous interior, so that defense and movement would be easier in case of war. Today, however, the other peoples of the former Yugoslavia are paying dear for knowledge of what the concentration of military industry in Serbian hands was really meant for.

Nor on the eve of the war for the homeland in Croatia did the nameless factory which newsmen have visited for the first time have a single engineer who had even a little experience in manufacturing the weapons of war. Its personnel and management even had no idea about what kind of weapons were most necessary to the Croatian police and army, and their first contact with defense matters occurred when they turned over to the police (because at that time neither the guards nor the army existed) the antiaircraft guns from their warehouse of the former territorial defense [TO]. Only then, when they saw Croatia's shortage of weapons, did the engineers of that factory begin to think about how to make the simplest and most necessary rifles and machine guns.

Production Under Anecdotal Conditions

The first pieces came off the production line under anecdotal conditions. The director recalled how the first drawings were made from pictures of weapons published in popular magazines! In order to study the materials, technology, and standards of the machine gun, the engineers so thoroughly destroyed the first specimen they obtained at great pains that its owner broke down crying when he got it back, because his personal weapon could no longer fire bullets.

Even today certain types of weapons are produced in the nameless factory at more than 40 sites. Not so the Serbs would be unable to destroy them in an air attack, but simply because the machines and other equipment used to machine and test the parts of the weapons were never envisaged and grouped for "special-purpose production"!

It is nevertheless a question of industrial technology. That is, during the war diverse weapons began to be manufactured in Croatia in dozens of factories and small workshops. But there is an insurmountable technological gap between industry and the "garage." The superintendent to whom we talked immediately cautioned us that it is a mistaken idea that quality weapons can be manufactured in improvised plants.

Weapons, that is, require a great deal of engineering knowledge, expensive and abundant equipment, quality materials, processing at the highest technological level, and micron accuracy. Croatia has already had bad experience with imported "Kalashnikovs" whose barrels bent downward after the very first clip was fired. The soldiers blamed that trouble on "bad Russian steel," but a more likely reason why the rifles became unusable in practice was that the bore was a thousandth of a millimeter too

small, the friction of the rifle bullet was too great, and so even quality steel was heated beyond the limit....

Development of the ERO Machine Gun—3 Million German Marks [DM]

The machines on which the weapons of war are being industrially produced in Croatia for the first time are rare even in the factories of West Europe. Metals and nonmetallic materials are cut by laser on these machines, lathes and milling machines operate according to "instructions" that come from a computer, machining is done with the support of work stations for computer-assisted design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM), with a check on the accuracy of the product—even without human presence!—down to the micron. At all those "machining centers," instead of the usual industrial workers, there are graduate engineers. There is no roar from machines, but quiet music is played; scattered scrap is unthinkable here; instead of eight hours spent standing at the machine, adjusting the tool, or repeating one and the same movement ad infinitum—only a check on the computer screen from time to time!

All of this, however, is very expensive. It is fortunate that Croatia has in its industry hundreds of doctors of science, but their work has to be paid for too. To illustrate, the managers of the nameless factory have discovered that development of the small ERO machine gun, very much like the famous Israeli Uzi, cost DM3 million! At the same time, the ERO is a machine gun patented almost 20 years ago and for engineers has no unknowns as to its design or production technology. The Croatian Defense Ministry, however, recently adopted a policy whereby it does not want to finance weapon development costs in advance. The ministry wants to see the finished product, and only if it is technically satisfactory and with its price is able to compete with foreign products is it ready to pay a portion of the development costs.

Such a policy is the consequence of bad experiences from the beginning of the war. At that time, Croatia was giving money in a convulsive effort to get production started on any weapon and under any conditions. Of course, many such efforts had no chance whatsoever of resulting in assembly-line production of quality weapons, so that a great deal of money was spent in vain. Today's decision of the Defense Ministry, however, that it will not finance development "blindly," will perhaps prevent even certain small and capable private factories from supplying the Croatian Army certain urgently needed parts for military equipment. In general, both models for financing weapons development exist in the world: Some countries force their defense industry to toughen themselves on the windswept marketplace; others are ready to coddle their military-industrial complex by paying every expenditure in advance. But it is rare for these two approaches to be mutually exclusive, as is the case in Croatia. Croatia is compelled to seek imaginative solutions even in the production technology for weapons. First of all, it is forced to buy materials and components which do not carry the label of being exclusively for military purposes. Fortunately, this includes most of the goods sufficient for standard weapons: chrome-molybdenum construction steels or integrated circuits, chips, such as are used in electronic games and consumer goods. They do not come under the embargo against the importation of weapons which the great powers have unselectively imposed on both the aggressors and victims of the war on the soil of the former Yugoslavia. The most important datum is that Croatia is able to develop the software for its own highly sophisticated weapons.

"We Have the Wherewithal To Bring Down the Serbian MiG's"

First of all, there is the engineering knowledge with which Croatia has improved and bettered some weapons that are already commonplace. The missiles for VBR, which are really produced in their entirety in Croatia, from the metal casing to the rocket engine and solid fuel, have increased range, which is driving enemy scouts crazy. The Russian Strela 2 launchers can fire at a plane only twice, and after that their batteries are flat, and they have to be discarded. Croatian launchers in the same class can "lock on the target" and fire up to 100 rounds before the batteries are flat, and after that the batteries can be recharged 100 times.

Ordinary mine detectors have to be moving over a mine buried in the ground to detect it, because they react to the change in magnetic flux. The Croatian detector may even be at rest over metal, and still detect it, which is a great improvement in the safety of pyrotechnical teams. Finally, missiles from the large air defense system will in the final phase of flight ignore infrared decoys which combat planes usually emit to protect themselves. The missile guidance system, that is, distinguishes not only the frequency range of the thermal emission of the aircraft and decoy, but also the size of the target which it is approaching at a speed greater than Mach 2.

"We read the other day that Serbia has purchased two new squadrons of MiG-29's from Russia," we were told by another informant in the "special-purpose industry," whose name we will not give. "So it perhaps would not be bad for the Serbs to learn that we have something to knock down all those MiG's at the medium altitudes to which they must drop for combat action." The Croatian air defense missile system has already demonstrated its power—it downed the first Serbian aircraft over Osijek!

Federal

Milosevic Dispute With Bosnian Serbs Viewed

PM2805084093 Paris LIBERATION in French 26 May 93 p 18

[Veronique Soule report: "End of the Idyll Between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs"]

[Text] Belgrade—"You will see, they will soon give the Nobel Peace Prize to Milosevic." This anecdote circulating in Serbian opposition circles says a great deal about the bitterness toward the Western countries. It also illustrates the skill of the Serbian head of state who, rallying to the Vance-Owen plan at the last minute, was easily able to improve his image with the international community. However, there is reason to wonder about the Serbian president's present tactics, particularly with regard to his Bosnian allies.

"If 6 million Serbs were to die for the cause, that would leave another 6 million to benefit from the fruits of their struggle," Biljana Plavsic, extremist leader of the Bosnian Serbs, said recently. "Anybody who says such things is a suitable case for the psychiatric hospital," Slobodan Milosevic replied. It is clear that the idyll between the Serbian leaders in Belgrade and those in Bosnia is over, and especially for one simple reason: President Milosevic does not like people standing up to him.

When he came to Pale to argue for the adoption of the peace plan, the Serbian head of state openly opposed the Bosnian Serb leaders. Although it is being implemented with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the embargo decreed on 6 May is also a symbolic gesture by which Belgrade wanted to dissociate itself from the diehard Bosnian leadership. Bosnia's leaders must now have authorization to enter Serbia.

"They were not willing to understand that this plan could be an initial step. For them, this plan was a disaster. For us, it was necessary to establish peace and to serve as a basis for dialogue." Zeljko Simic, adviser to President Milosevic, admits that there are "serious differences" between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs, but he refuses to talk of "conflict." "Henceforth, the Bosnian Serbs can no longer count on such strong political support as before. They must take their destiny in hand," he stressed.

But it would be premature to talk of an irremediable divorce. The quarrel seems to reflect primarily tactical disagreements and the struggle for power. For the two sides, the war's main goal—to ensure control of the Bosnian territories regarded as Serbian—has in fact been achieved. On the basis of this observation, President Milosevic, who is under strong pressure from the West and, after Boris Yeltsin's success in the referendum, is convinced that Russia will not fly to his aid, deemed it more prudent to rally round to the peace plan, at least verbally.

Nearing their goal and convinced that the West would not intervene, the Bosnian Serbs decided to take the other gamble. "Between keeping their seats and risking the firing squad, the choice was obvious," Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement (the main opposition party) stressed. In view of the international passivity following rejection of the Vance-Owen plan by the Pale "parliament," the Bosnian Serbs have scored a point at the expense of the Belgrade leader.

But Slobodan Milosevic certainly does not regard himself as defeated and is keeping trump cards in his hand. Of course, he could have saved his support for the Vance-Owen plan, which has in practice been abandoned by the Western countries. But this attitude enabled him to make a timid return to the international stage, which he probably intends to exploit in order to avoid new sanctions.

In the domestic sphere, although the decision to introduce an embargo on the Bosnian Serbs was rather badly received by Serbian opinion, his pacifist shift was well received. According to the opinion polls, a clear majority of Serbian Serbs are in favor of the peace plan. On the other hand, most of the Serbs are hostile to the dispatch of international observers to the Serbian-Bosnian border—a measure which Milosevic is rejecting.

"He has lost the support of fervent patriots on one side but he has won over the undecided; Milosevic is still strong," Mihajlo Markovic, deputy chairman of the Socialist Party (former Communist Party, in government), said calmly. Surprised by the about-face by the head of state, the Serbian opposition admits that it cannot do much other than support Milosevic in his new policy and the Democratic Party has even proposed a "common front" of all forces in favor of peace.

Slobodan Milosevic is, as usual, probably playing a complex game the ins and outs of which he alone knows. Several hypotheses are circulating in Belgrade. One Machiavellian hypothesis suggests that the expressed disagreements are merely a pretense in which Karadzic and Milosevic have divided up the roles between them. Another analysis simply evokes the "realism" of Milosevic who apparently thought that with an economy asphyxiated by sanctions, Serbia no longer had the means to support another year of war.

According to a third hypothesis, President Milosevic, whose ultimate aim is still to consolidate his power, has, at least for the time being, abandoned the idea of "uniting all Serbs in one state." "When he came back from Pale," Mihajlo Markovic stressed, "he was very angry; over there he saw popes everywhere and people constantly making the sign of the cross. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs wants to establish a monarchy with Prince Tomislav (Footnote) (Tomislav, of the Karadjordjevic dynasty, is claiming the throne against Prince Aleksandar who lives in exile in London)."

According to this hypothesis, President Milosevic, who is primarily a Socialist, has gauged the ideological gulf

separating him from the Bosnian Serbs, and especially the danger which these conservative forces would present for him in the case of unification. Indeed, if we take account of the alliance between the Bosnian Serbs and the Radical Party (nationalist extremist) of Vojislav Seselj, the second biggest party in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic's Socialists would no longer be mathematically assured of maintaining power. "Milosevic has never wanted Greater Serbia," his adviser Simic said with impatience; "his goal has always been to secure the right to self-determination for the Serbs so that they are not second-class citizens in a state." Leaving aside rhetorical arguments, Slobodan Milosevic undoubtedly supported the war of conquest in Bosnia and Croatia which clearly amounts to supporting the idea of Greater Serbia.

Although with the joint action plan, the Western countries seem to be accepting the Serbian fait accompli, in Pale and Belgrade, each is now struggling for power. And in Belgrade, President Milosevic is discovering that it is not so easy to control Karadzic and his men, who are euphoric with victory. But he probably also knows that Bosnia's little Serbian state will in any case need its big brother to survive.

SRS Leader Seselj Accuses Panic, Cosic

LD2705193893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1820 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Belgrade, May 27 (TANJUG)—Leader of the opposition Serbian Radical Party (SRS) Vojislav Seselj on Thursday resumed his campaign against highest political and military officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and accused Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic of being the "leading figure implicated in the generals' affair."

Addressing a news conference in Belgrade, Seselj accused Cosic, who is also supreme commander of the Army of Yugoslavia, of not devoting attention to office abuse among the highest generals.

The leader of the strongest opposition party in the parliaments of Yugoslavia and Serbia has several times so far publicly accused chief of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, General Zivota Panic and members of his family of being implicated in financial affairs in the Army of Yugoslavia.

A state commission was formed by the Supreme Defense Council last Wednesday to investigate the allegations. The commission will report its findings to the Supreme Defense Council, which is made up of the presidents of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro.

Seselj last Friday testified before the state commission and afterwards told the press the affair "will not end with Gen. Panic's replacement."

Gen. Panic on Wednesday sued Seselj for slander, TANJUG has learned.

When asked at the news conference how strong his influence in the Army was, Seselj said "it will yet be shown." He said his party was not impeding the transformation of the Army of Yugoslavia but was "helping it get up on its feet."

The Army of Yugoslavia General Staff recently termed untrue and grossest slander the accusations made by Seselj against Gen. Panic and said the aim of those accusations was the "destabilization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its armed force." The Army of Yugoslavia General Staff said the accusations were part of the "attempts of some parties and their leaders to achieve influence on the Army of Yugoslavia and then use the Army for their own party and political ends."

Gen. Panic recently said that Seselj did not substantiate his allegations with a single argument and that he was in fact trying "directly to interfere in personnel matters in the Army of Yugoslavia and not only them."

Seselj on Thursday accused President Cosic also of "demagogically declining to accept the presidential salary" while, at the same time, tolerating high spending by his advisers, about which Seselj said he would soon provide evidence in public.

Yugoslav President Cosic has more than once distanced himself from and condemned radical currents on the political stage of Yugoslavia and Serbia.

Possible Successors to General Panic

AU2705183193 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 May 93 p 7

[Radovan Pavlovic report: "What Is Going On in the Military Leadership"]

[Excerpts] Unless new witnesses who could help shed light on the Kentaur affair appear, the state commission of the Supreme Defense Council will complete the investigation of credibility of the accusations at the expense of General Panic, commander of the General Staff of the FRY Army, by tomorrow or by the end of the week at the latest.

These are unofficial estimates, as the three-member commission is investigating the case in great secrecy. Since its formation, the commission had interrogated Vojislav Seselj [leader of the Serbian Radical Party], General Panic, and his son Goran, director of Kentaur enterprise. They also closely examined all the necessary documents and papers relating to Kentaur's agreements and cooperation with the military units and institutions.

It is expected that the state commission will not make public statements but will forward its findings to the Supreme Defense Council, which, as it is known, consists of the presidential trio—[FRY President] Dobrica Cosic, [Serbian President] Slobodan Milosevic, and Momir Bulatovic [president of the Montenegrin Presidency]. It

is up to them when and in what manner the public will be informed about who is right—Vojislav Seselj or Zivota Panic.

What Is Happening in Kentaur

[passage omitted]

Perhaps it is still to soon to embark upon any sort of cadre permutations of generals. However, bearing in mind that one of the determinations of the long-announced transformation of the FRY Army is to break with the old set of generals and freshen the military pyramid with younger and ideologically unburdened officers, the changes in the military leadership must be expected.

Cadre Changes

Who could take the baton from General Panic? He is the officer who arrived at the head of the General Staff in a moment when 38 generals were pensioned off and when the Yugoslav People's Army was roaming around bewildered in the Yugoslav war whirl. The general who was known as an excellent tank driver among the soldiers, before being appointed the commander, had been the commander of a battalion and a regiment, commander of the staff, commander of a brigade, division, and a corps, commander of the Army Staff, and commander of a military district. At all positions he received the highest official praise.

Judging by the current ratio of powers within the military establishment, it is rumored that the first officer of the military air force—General Bozidar Stevanovic—stands the highest chance of slipping into Panic's armchair. It could be sensed between the lines of his latest address to the public that the first "blue man" [reference to color of Air Force uniform] was putting himself forward for the position of the commander of the General Staff. Some other assessments believe that General Stefanovic has a poor rating among the officers and soldiers—due to his age, his political (some say even, party) behavior, and the Opera affair.

Currently the second man in the General Staff, Panic's deputy General-Colonel Dragoljub Simonovic, who was until recently the commander of the Third Military District, also enjoys high rating.

The option that an entirely new, young and anonymous set of uncompromised generals should be brought at the head of the General Staff is also in the air.

Stoltenberg Cancels Visit to Belgrade

LD2705180193 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1727 GMT 27 May 93

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 27 May (TANJUG)—The visit to Belgrade tomorrow by Thorvald Stoltenberg, co-chairman of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, has been canceled without explanation. [passage omitted]

Instead of receiving confirmation of the visit today, Mile Pesut, secretary of the Federal Government Committee for Cooperation with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], received a telegram from Arvelly Santana, acting UNPROFOR coordinator of cooperation, saying that "Mr. Stoltenberg's visit had to be canceled."

Having expressed gratitude to the committee for providing help in organizing this visit which will not materialise, the telegram expresses the hope that "the visit will be scheduled for some other time" about which the coordinator will inform the committee in due time.

May Inflation Rate Exceeds 200 Percent

LD2705130193 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 27 May 93

[Summary] Belgrade, 27 May (TANJUG)—The inflation rate in Yugoslavia for the month of May was 205.2 percent, declared Mirjana Rankovic, assistant general director of the Federal Statistics Institute, at a news conference today.

Over the past month—prices are registered from the 20th of the previous month to the 20th of the current month—the greatest price hikes affected agricultural products, reaching 273.3 percent, and gasoline and heating fuel, whose prices went up eightfold.

Retail prices in May this year, compared to the same period last year, are 2,863 times higher, Rankovic said.

Serbia

MP's Call For No-Confidence Vote

LD2705175693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1532 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Belgrade, May 27 (TANJUG)—A group of the Serbian parliament's opposition members on Thursday called for a vote of no-confidence in the republic's government because of its failure to prepare an economic crisis programme and the corruption of its ministers.

The initiative was launched by 19 MPs [members of parliament] from the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS) and two deputies from the Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM).

Serbia's minority government was formed by the ruling Socialist Party after it won 101 of the 250 mandates in the December 1992 election.

The 19 MPs said the "government of Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic has not even after four months come out with a programme, or at least a plan, to get Serbia out of the economic crisis."

A year ago, the U.N. imposed stringent political and economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of its alleged involvement in a civil and religious war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yugoslavia's losses caused by the embargo have so far reached 20 billion dollars, in addition to a galloping inflation and massive unemployment with every second working-age Yugoslav not working.

"The government of Nikola Sainovic must resign also because some of the former and present ministers have been detained on charge of corruption," said the text of the initiative.

Serbia's Trade and Tourism Minister Velimir Mihailovic was detained in early March on charge of office abuse, following the arrest on the same charge of Sava Vlajkovic, his predecessor in the cabinet of ex-Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic.

The parliament is still in session, and it is uncertain when it will discuss the initiative.

Apart from 101 seats held by the ruling SPS, the parliament is made up of 73 deputies from the Serbian Radical Party, 50 DEPOS, nine DZVM and 17 MPs from another three parties and groups of citizens.

The acceptance of the no-confidence motion requires a simple majority of MPs (half plus one).

Serbian-Macedonian Rapprochement

93BA1026F Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 10 May 93 p 12

[Article by Branko Jokic: "Rapprochement in the Southern Balkans"]

[Text] *More and more people in Macedonia think that relations with Serbia should not be exacerbated; is the Serbian Orthodox Church changing its attitude toward the Macedonian Orthodox Church?*

From our correspondent.

Skopje, 9 May—It is still possible to cross the Serbian-Macedonian border with only personal identification. Customs officers are inspecting luggage less and less, and are even angry when UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] personnel do it, even if it is only occasionally. There is no army on either side of the border.

More and more people in Macedonia are inclined toward the opinion that relations with Serbia should not be exacerbated too much, and that it would be fatal for the Macedonian economy if the border were closed on this side. More than 70 percent of the transit and commercial transactions, in fact, goes through Serbia.

For a long time now the Skopje media have not been saying harsh words about Serbia, and they are attributing the plan for the destabilization of Macedonia that recently came to light to the KOS [military counterintelligence service] and the leadership of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], with the comment that official Serbia did not have anything to do with it. It can even be heard that Milosevic, as he is supposed to have announced himself, will confirm the recognition of Macedonia that Milan Panic already carried out last December, which means that Serbia will finally recognize that state. That is what is being said by Skopje's VECER, which expresses the hope that it will happen soon, possibly as early as next week after Kiro Gligorov's meeting in New York with Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, which was announced by NOVA MAKEDONIJA, whereas neither Mitsotakis's office nor Kiro Gligorov's has confirmed anything yet.

The first step toward strengthening relations between Macedonia and Serbia was taken by the Serbian Orthodox Church, something that no one expected. The Easter congratulations that its head, Patriarch Pavle, sent to the head of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Gavrilo, was accepted as an attempt to bridge over the dispute that has gone on for almost 30 years, and as an indication that the Orthodox sister in Belgrade will recognize the autocephalism of the Macedonian church. The greeting was addressed to: "His Excellency, the head of the Macedonian Orthodox Church," whereas all the previous ones were addressed to "the Skopje Metropolitan."

Up until recently, the Serbian Orthodox Church, which also sent its clergy to Skopje, publicly voiced claims upon the more than 600 church installations and cultural-historical monuments in Macedonia, saying that they were "monuments of Serbian culture and of the medieval past." It pointed out that Emperor Dusan was crowned in Skopje, and that the first Serbian patriarch was proclaimed there, while prominent historians from the Serbian Academy of Sciences published a whole series of collections and other works in which they tried to prove that the area north of Veles and Prilep, which is now Macedonian, is "Old Serbia."

What has changed in the meantime? Some people think that the Serbian Orthodox Church was frightened by the penetration of the Balkans by Pope John Paul II, who recently visited Shkoder, and by the support that the Vatican expressed for the autocephalism of the Macedonian church. It has been heard that in some distant future the "Catholicization of Macedonians" is even planned, and consequently the Serbian Orthodox Church, which "is aware of all this, would like to protect its Orthodox brethren."

Kosovo

Seselj Forcing Demand for Independence

AU2805103293 Tirana ATA in English 1005 GMT 28 May 93

[Text] Tirana, May 28 (ATA)—In the name of the republic of Kosovo, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi has sent a letter to the U.S. President Clinton. After expressing his thanks for the efforts made to formulate a program of joint action for the prevention of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bukoshi writes that this program has been considered by

the Serbs as a great victory of theirs. Since they have failed in other parts of former Yugoslavia, they will return to the question of Kosovo in their known way. There are clear signs of the conflict at present.

One of the Serbian opposition leader, the letter says, Vuk Draskovic [of the Serbian Renewal Party], has declared these days that Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, is for some months exerting his force to stir up the conflict in Kosovo. I would like to underline that Albanians of Kosovo, after the disintegration of the Yugoslavia federation, whose constituent part was Kosovo as well, have no other way but to demand their independence. We have been and are resolute, the letter says, to attain our goals through peaceful means. We do not envisage any backwards step in this process. We are worrying over the fact that the program for joint action is insufficient. We express our regret why the independence of Kosovo is not supported in these documents. An independent Kosovo, Premier Bukoshi says, may be the only factor of stability. Any other solution will create for the region a pending potential problem, which sooner or later, will involve the Balkans in a destructive war.

Dr. Bukoshi points out in the letter that based on the actual situation, we appeal to the Security Council to organize an international conference as soon as possible on the measures of preventing a Balkan war. It will also consider real possibilities of preventing the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Kosovo and Macedonia. In this regard, we offer our cooperation and full support.

Rugova Requests Deployment, Refuses 'Division'

AU2705190993 Tirana ATA in English 1819 GMT 27 May 93

[Text] Tirana, May 27 (ATA)—At a press conference held in Prishtina recently on the Serbian project for the division of Kosova, President Rugova said that "we cannot accept any division of Kosova because there is not any ethnic and geographic basis for this act. Kosova has its own borders," he said. "It is an ethnic compact region. It is clear that Serbia offers now a division, through which it intends to take all the regions rich in natural and economic resources. This is unacceptable. Through this Serbia aims at neutralizing the idea of the independence of Kosova, an idea that has now penetrated in many international circles and research institutions, which are projecting the geopolitical future, but this time," Rugova stressed, "Serbia will be unsuccessful."

Responding a question by reporters that what will the UN peace keeping forces do in Kosova at this stage, President Rugova said that "we are demanding from international organizations to deploy here troops as a preventive measure. We have also asked the establishment of an international protectorate and that by decision of the UN Security Council, Kosova be demilitarized. Adoption of these measures would create conditions for the functioning of the democratic institutions in Kosova. The power institutions in Kosova," Rugova said, "were occupied by Serbia three years ago and their return without international observation is impossible because so far the Serbs have not manifested good will to hold constructive talks which offer a solution." Further on he said that international community should stop the logic of dictating political solutions through force anywhere in the world, in the Balkans as well. Responding the question whether there is any readiness and possibility for the international factor to stop the dictate of Serbia in the Balkans, President Rugova underlined that international community is resolute to stop it. Since 1918, 1945 and 1989 and until now, Serbia has imposed solutions through force, Rugova said.

Rugova: Serbs Given 'Green Light' in Kosovo

PM2705154093 Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 27 May 93 p 12

[Interview with Ibrahim Rugova, "president of the Kosovo Albanians," by correspondent Marco Ventura in Pristina; date not given]

[Text] Pristina—Serbian policemen stop the coaches coming and going from Glogovac, a Kosovo village a few kilometers from Pristina, the capital. The Albanians diligently alight, forming a silent line and looking down at their worn shoes. One look too many, one challenging stare at the militiaman in his camouflage outfit collecting identity documents at the point of a machine gun, could be dangerous. Just here, two Serbian soldiers were killed in an ambush a few days ago, inside their bullet-ridden van. "We have the names of those responsible," the policeman barks: "Today the situation is calm, you may go. Nobody will shoot at your Belgrade license plate. This is Serbia, not Albania." Yet 90 percent of the population of Kosovo, which is formally a Serbian province, are of Albanian nationality. Last year, in clandestine elections opposed by the central government in Belgrade, they elected an intellectual, former Sorbonne student Ibrahim Rugova, 48, as president.

Beyond Glogovac, in Drenica, the roundups continue. Arkan—in real life Zeljko Raznjatovic, a Serbian deputy and gang leader of the "baby tigers," experts in massacring Croats and Muslims in Slavonia and Bosnia—comes to Pristina virtually every other day. Today, in a news conference in Belgrade, he is calling for a state of emergency in Kosovo, for police and the Army to be sent in, and for special troops to be deployed on the Albanian border: "Too many arms and too many terrorists are getting through. The situation is very serious, and as for Rugova, he has foreign citizenship, he is Albanian; Yugoslavia should withdraw its hospitality from him." Serbian Radical Party leader Vojslav Seselj also walks around freely in Pristina. The capital is in a state of siege; any rebellion would be bloodily stamped out. Rugova, president in name only, governs the nonexistent state from the premises of the Kosovo Writers' Association. At the house next door, an art teacher is holding an

outdoor lesson: That is the Fine Arts Institute. Rugova received us in a small room.

[Ventura] Mr. President, how do you interpret Seselj's and Arkan's renewed activism?

[Rugova] They are trying to provoke; they are working simply to stir up clashes. In Slavonia the system worked, and war broke out. The worst thing is that they have close ties with military circles. The world is aware of the seriousness of what could happen in Kosovo. Too many interests are involved in the area; other countries would inevitably get involved: Macedonia, Bulgaria. It would be a Balkan war.

[Ventura] The allies and Russia have given up any form of military intervention in Bosnia...

[Rugova] I still do not want to believe that they have abandoned Bosnia to its fate; that would mean giving the green light to Serbian military operations in Kosovo. The document prepared by the five is, I think, of a temporary nature. Yet the crisis in the former Yugoslavia can only have a global solution. Furthermore, we are not satisfied by the failure to support Kosovo's declaration of independence.

[Ventura] What concrete measures should the international community take to prevent war?

[Rugova] Sending several thousand Blue Helmets is essential. Kosovo should become a UN protectorate. If Serbia does not agree, it will be necessary to find a way of forcing it to. By political means, I hope. But if necessary, with military intervention, with the aim of deploying troops. We are defenseless here, with no police force or territorial defense. We cannot defend ourselves from aggression.

[Ventura] Is the Serbian aim the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo?

[Rugova] Yes, that is what it is. Unfortunately the machine has been started and now it is moving forward of its own accord.

[Ventura] The Serbs claim Kosovo for historical reasons; it is the setting of all their myths.

[Rugova] That argument is ridiculous. I understand their historical and religious feelings. We certainly do not deny the historical presence of the Serbs in this territory. Yet a solution will have to be found, since the population today is ethnically homogeneous, and it is Albanian. Anyhow, I believe that in Belgrade they are mainly interested in Kosovo's resources.

[Ventura] Is there a danger that Europe's prudent position and the Serbian regime's harshness will rouse a corresponding radicalism among the Albanians?

[Rugova] Yes. A paradoxical situation might even arise whereby Seselj's paramilitary followers could supply arms to radical Albanian groups under the counter, in order to provoke incidents.

[Ventura] What can Italy do?

[Rugova] A lot. Italy knows us and understands our problems. But your government should adopt a more active policy where Kosovo is concerned. Hitherto it has been passive.

[Ventura] Predictions?

[Rugova] We put up with provocation daily. They come into the villages and round up the people. There is a huge military presence. There are the paramilitary formations, and then the Serbian civilians are all armed; they are the most dangerous. Unfortunately, two generations of Albanians have already been forced into exile. Now it could be the turn of the third.